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THE FUTURE OF QUANTIFYING
TRIBAL WATER RIGHTS IN NORTH DAKOTA
“When we talk about water, we call it mni wiconi,
and that means water is life.”1
I.

INTRODUCTION

While there is no doubt that water is a cornerstone of life,2 water to
many North Dakotans has often been both a blessing and a curse.3 From
floods, droughts, and the failure of municipal water systems, to arguments
both for and against the diversion of water from some of the state’s major
bodies, North Dakota is not a stranger to water conflict.4
The disputes have involved the Devils Lake outlet,5 proposals to divert
water from the Missouri River to supply the Red River Valley,6 and
addressing issues of water shortage in the western part of the state.7 The
debates have occurred between neighbors,8 between North Dakota and
1. Hearing on H B. 1025 Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 2007 Leg., 60th Sess. 20
(N.D. 2007) [hereinafter Hearing on H.B. 1025] (statement of Jessie Taken Alive, Standing Rock
Sioux Reservation). “Mni wiconi” derives from the Dakota, Lakota, Nakota Sioux language. Id.
2. See DAVID H. GETCHES, WATER LAW IN A NUTSHELL 6 (3d ed. 1997) (“Water is necessary to survival.”).
3. See, e.g., Water Supply Issues in the Arid West: Hearing Before the Comm. on Energy and
Natural Res., 108th Cong. 51-52 (2004) [hereinafter Hearing on Water Supply Issues in the Arid
West] (statement of Tex Hall, President of Nat’l Cong. of Am. Indians and Chairman of Mandan,
Hidatsa and Arikara Nation) (detailing the effects of a drought in western North Dakota during
flooding in eastern North Dakota).
4. See id. (stating droughts in the western part of North Dakota were having a drastic effect,
with one result being that the communities of Parshall and Garrison, North Dakota experienced
emergencies due to municipal water shortages).
5. See People to Save the Sheyenne River, Inc. v. N.D. Dep’t of Health, 2005 ND 104, ¶ 2-7,
697 N.W.2d 319, 323 (holding that the Devils Lake outlet project could continue to divert water
into the Sheyenne River). In Sheyenne River, two citizen groups teamed with the Canadian
Government and opposed a permit granted to the North Dakota Water Commission to divert water
from Devils Lake into the Sheyenne River. Id. ¶ 1. The groups had concerns regarding the spread
of pollution and invasive species and potential flooding to land near the Sheyenne River. Id. ¶ 67, 697 N.W.2d at 324.
6. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-24.7(01)-(05) (2007) (appropriating funds for the Red River
Valley Water Supply Project); Dakota Water Resources Act of 1999, H.R. 106-203, 106th Cong.
(1999) (providing for the study of possible alternatives to supply the Red River Valley with water,
one of which was diverting water from the Missouri River in North Dakota).
7. See Hearing on Water Supply Issues in the Arid West, supra note 3, at 51-52 (detailing the
effects of the drought and mismanagement of the Missouri river resulting in water shortages).
8. Graber v. Logan County Water Res. Bd., 1999 ND 168, ¶ 2, 598 N.W.2d 846, 847.
Graber involved a request for an injunction to stop a neighbor from using a drainage ditch and
other water diversion methods that were forcing water onto adjacent land causing flooding and
transfer of livestock pollution into nearby waters. Id. ¶ 2-3.
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Canada,9 and between North Dakota and other states downstream on the
Missouri River.10 With all of this discussion about water, to whom it belongs, and where it should and should not go, one important party has
continually been missing.11 Collectively this party has a right that arguably
will outweigh all others in the state in priority, volume, and consequences, 12
but has seen little or no water or recognition of water rights.13 Over the
decades, it has been the Indian tribes 14 that have not been involved in deciding how state water should be used, despite the likelihood that a large
volume of that water belongs to them.15
To tribes, water cannot be owned.16 It is sacred and a part of tribal
culture, custom, and ceremonies.17 Water is viewed as a living being not
9. See supra note 5 and accompanying text (discussing the lawsuit commenced by Canada
and other related parties regarding the Devils Lake outlet).
10. See, e.g., E.T.S.I. Pipeline Project v. Missouri, 484 U.S. 495, 495-96 (1988) (stating that
the dispute is between the upper basin states on the Missouri River and the lower basin state of
Missouri).
11. See Elizabeth Checchio & Bonnie G. Colby, The Context for Indian Water Settlements,
in WATER LAW TRENDS, POLICIES, AND PRACTICE 179, 179 (Kathleen Marion Carr & James D.
Crammond eds., 1995) (“Indian tribes control large amounts of land in many western states and
vast entitlements to western water resources.”).
12. COMPTROLLER GENERAL’S REPORT TO THE CONGRESS, RESERVED WATER RIGHTS FOR
FEDERAL AND INDIAN RESERVATIONS: A GROWING CONTROVERSY IN NEED OF RESOLUTION 18
(1978) [hereinafter COMPTROLLER GENERAL’S REPORT]. Significant water will be required for
many reservations to satisfy their purposes. Id. Additionally, many western states have over-appropriated water sources to non-Indian users which, consequently, may lose their rights when
Indian tribes begin to exercise the rights delineated by the federal government. Susan M.
Williams, Panel III: Missouri River Dialogue: Tribal and Conservationist Perspectives, 7 GREAT
PLAINS NAT. RESOURCES J. 35, 37 (2002).
13. See Hearing on Water Supply Issues in the Arid West, supra note 3, at 54 (statement of
Tex Hall, President of Nat’l Cong. of Am. Indians and Chairman of Mandan, Hidatsa and Arikara
Nation) (“Despite historical and legal rights to the water, Missouri River Basin tribes have been
excluded from the benefits of the Missouri River water resources and its tributaries.”).
14. KENNETH BOBROFF ET AL., COHEN’S HANDBOOK ON FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 135
(Robert T. Anderson et al. eds., 2005). The federal government, courts, and commentators
consistently use the terms “Indian tribe” and “Indian” in the field of water law. Id. “For federal
purposes, the term ‘Indian Tribe’ or ‘Indian nation’ refer[s] to an indigenous North American
group with which the United States has developed a legal relationship.” Id. “Tribe” is the term
often used to describe indigenous entities that are political entities for the purpose of negotiated
treaties. Id. In this note, water rights belonging to American Indians will be referred to as “tribal
water rights” because those rights flow out of the creation of reservations by treaty. See Winters
v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 577-78 (1908) (stating that water rights were created when tribes
signed treaties relinquishing land in return for small, reservation land and federal monies). Whenever referring to indigenous people, the term American Indian will be used. See, e.g., LLOYD
BURTON, AMERICAN INDIAN WATER RIGHTS AND THE LIMITS OF LAW 4 (1991) (using the term
“American Indian”). “American Indian” is preferred because this term is the choice among indigenous people for the fact it is more accurate than the term “Native American.” Id. “Native
American” suggests a similar experience for all tribes, which historically was not the case. Id.
15. See COMPTROLLER GENERAL’S REPORT, supra note 12, at 18 (stating that tribes are
suspected to hold water rights to a significant amount of water).
16. Williams, supra note 12, at 36.
17. Id.
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subject to ownership or control.18 To states, however, water is public
property to which rights of ownership exist.19
In western states, rights to water are determined by the prior appropriation doctrine.20 Although this doctrine may vary slightly in implementation
from state to state, it provides that the first party to divert water and put it to
a beneficial use holds a water right.21 The water rights holder that diverts
water first will hold the superior right and any subsequent parties diverting
water will have a water right that is junior to the first party diverting.22
Water rights fall under the jurisdiction of the states.23 Typically, the
perfection of a water right will include filing for a permit along with diverting the water for a beneficial use.24 Permits are granted by a water commission or department that is given the duty to handle water administration.25
In North Dakota, the North Dakota Water Commission administers water
rights.26

18. Id.
19. Id.
20. GETCHES, supra note 2, at 6. The prior appropriation doctrine reserves water rights to
the first person to put the water to a beneficial use. Id. This doctrine is used in the western part of
the United States where water is scarcer. Id.; ALASKA STAT. § 46.15.050(a) (2008); ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 45-151E (2006); COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92.301(3) (2007); IDAHO CODE ANN.
§ 42-106 (2007); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-717a (2006); MONT CODE ANN. § 85-2-401 (2007);
NEV. REV. STAT. § 533.040(2) (2007); N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-04-06.3 (2007); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 537.120 (2007); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 41-4-317 (2007). Although jurisdictions vary slightly, all
have some variation of three basic elements to establish appropriation. GETCHES, supra note 2, at
88. “[G]enerally water must be diverted with an intent to appropriate it for a beneficial use.” Id.
The individual who first puts that water to beneficial use holds water rights superior to anyone
who later makes beneficial use of water from the same source. Id. at 101. Once putting the water
to beneficial use, the “first in time, first in right” individual must follow any requirements in state
law necessary to reserve the water and to perfect their right. Id. at 6. Typically, states require
rights holders to file a permit with the state detailing their use and the priority date. Id. at 89.
North Dakota determines water rights through the prior appropriation doctrine. N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 61-04-06.3. Under North Dakota law, the priority date is determined to be the date on which a
permit is filed. Id. § 61-04-02. After obtaining a water right, that right is valid for as long as the
right holder puts that water to a beneficial use. GETCHES, supra note 2, at 6.
21. GETCHES, supra note 2, at 88. Anyone who first puts water to a beneficial use has superiority to a party that next puts water from the same body to use. Id. at 6. In prior appropriation
states, water rights depend on water usage rather than where one lives. Id. at 4. In riparian states,
water rights are granted to those with land adjacent to water bodies, meaning that location, rather
than use, is the focus. Id. at 3, 6. The riparian doctrine is commonly used in eastern states and
delineates water rights to landowners who border bodies of water or waterways. Id. at 3.
22. Id. at 6.
23. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-02-01.1 (creating the North Dakota Water Commission
to develop and manage water in the state); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 1-40-11 (2007) (creating the
Department of Environmental and Natural Resources to regulate water in the state of South
Dakota).
24. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-02-03 (stating that to perfect a water right, individuals
must apply for a permit with the state and have that permit granted).
25. Id. § 61-02-01.1.
26. Id. § 61-02-14.
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However, Indian tribes’ right to water is different because it arises out
of federal rather than state law.27 Federal law provides that when the government reserved land for Indian reservations, the government also reserved
enough water for the present and future needs of the tribe. 28 Since the
recognition of Indian water rights by the United States Supreme Court, a
cloud of confusion has surrounded the laws regarding those rights.29 The
United States Supreme Court has done little to clarify key issues such as the
quantity of water to which tribes are entitled, the means to arrive at that
quantity, and the logistics of how water will be managed between the state
and tribal governments.30
Little predictability exists in the area of Indian water rights for several
reasons.31 First, the complicated relationship between a tribe’s reserved
water rights and state water laws, along with a lack of guidance from the
United States Supreme Court, has led to the creation of court made systems
as diverse as the states.32 Further, a long history of conflict between tribes
and state and federal governments has added a political element to these

27. Hearing on Water Supply Issues in the Arid West, supra note 3, at 54.
28. Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 577 (1908).
29. See Checchio & Colby, supra note 11, at 183 (stating that the blending of multiple legal
principles has caused diverse interpretations in state courts leading to confusion regarding tribal
water rights).
30. See generally Gina McGovern, Settlement or Adjudication: Resolving Indian Reserved
Rights, 36 ARIZ. L. REV. 195, 195 (1994) (discussing the complex history that led to the current
complexities of tribal water rights); see also Col. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States,
424 U.S. 800, 811 (1971) (providing that state courts can hear tribal water adjudications even
though the right is a federally created right); Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 600 (1963)
(stating that the purpose of the tribe is agriculture and that a quantified water right will be
determined by computing the acreage of the reservation that can be practically irrigated); Winters,
207 U.S. at 576-78 (holding that when land was set aside for reservations, a right to water to
support that land was also reserved); In re Gen. Adjudication of all Rights to Use of Water in the
Gila River Sys. & Source, 35 P.3d 68, 74 (Ariz. 2001) (holding that the purpose of a reservation
was not agriculture, but to provide a homeland to tribes).
31. See Grover et al., Tribal—State Dispute Resolution: Recent Attempts, 36 S.D. L. REV.
277, 277 (1991) (describing the relationship between federal, state, and tribal governments to be
“adversarial” and “discouraging” leading to a “[deepened] mutual dislike and mistrust”). The
adversarial relationship often mentioned in discussions of quantification of tribal water rights
began with decades of Indian water rights being ignored by state and federal governments. Susan
Brienza, Wet Water vs. Paper Rights: Indian and Non-Indian Negotiated Settlements and Their
Effects, 11 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 151, 157 (1992). The federal government continued to develop
water projects in the West that created a long list of users that now are staking claims to the water
that likely belongs to tribes. Id. States are challenged with balancing the opposing interests
where, on one hand, current rights holders are faced with losing water they have relied upon for
years and, on the other hand, tribes are demanding recognition of their longstanding federal right.
Id. at 158. It seems that appropriating a great deal of water that likely belongs to Indian tribes has
put the states in a compromising position. Id. Many tribes believe that this will lead to windfalls
for their tribe. Id. State courts are faced with a decision between honoring the right granted under
Winters and compromising federal, state, and local developments that have been ignoring tribal
rights for years. Id. at 160.
32. Brienza, supra note 31, at 164-66.
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decisions, meaning that the nature of relationships between the tribe and
state has contributed to the diversity in results regarding tribal water
rights.33 Both the political relationships and spiritual connection to the
water are as important in this discussion as are the tribes and their needs.34
Among the parties involved in this process are the Indian tribes of
North Dakota.35 The state is home to four federally recognized Indian
tribes: Spirit Lake Tribe, Standing Rock Sioux Tribe (Standing Rock),
Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation (Fort Berthold),
and Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa Indians (Turtle Mountain).36 Each
of these tribes holds a right to water in the state that has yet to be exercised
or recognized; therefore, the result has been that no delivery of actual “wet”
water to the tribe has occurred.37 In North Dakota, like many other states
across the western United States, it is likely that tribal water rights will be
asserted in the near future.38 North Dakota leaders have found themselves
where many leaders of other states have been before them—staring in the
face of one of the most “major resource challenges facing the American
West.”39
To understand the questions North Dakota tribal and state leaders will
encounter in determining the actual quantity tribes are entitled to, it is first
important to understand quantification.40 Part II of this note explains tribal
water rights including a look at the complex historical and judicial

33. Id. at 161.
34. Id. at 176.
35. See GETCHES, supra note 2, at 330 (noting that adjudication and quantification of tribal
water rights occurs between the state, Indian tribes, and the federal government).
36. Indian Entities Recognized and Eligible to Receive Services From the United States
Bureau of Indian Affairs: Notice, 72 Fed. Reg. 13648-652 (Mar. 22, 2007).
37. See Hearing on S B. 2115, 2005 Leg., 59th Sess. 1-2 (N.D. 2005) (statement of Dave
Ripley, Director of Water Appropriations Division, North Dakota Water Commission) (“[C]urrent
state law does not contain a procedure allowing the state to negotiate with tribes or the federal
government to quantify reserved water rights.”). This note refers to the concept of “paper water”
and “wet water” that are used throughout writings regarding the quantification of tribal water
rights. DANIEL MCCOOL, NATIVE WATERS: CONTEMPORARY INDIAN WATER SETTLEMENTS
AND THE SECOND TREATY ERA 101 (2002). “Paper water” refers to the Winters rights held by Indians that exist only on paper and, without quantification, will result in no actual “wet” water. Id.
38. See June 6, 2006, Minutes of Interim Comm. on Agriculture and Natural Res., 2005 Leg.,
59th Interim Sess. 6 (N.D. 2005) [hereinafter June 6, 2006, Minutes] (statement of Tom Davis,
Water Resource Director, Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa Indians) (stating that unless the
state takes action towards quantification, the Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa Indians will
pursue quantification by commencing a lawsuit).
39. Checchio & Colby, supra note 11, at 179; see also Hearing on H B. 1025, supra note 1,
at 1 (statement of Chet Pollert, Member, N.D. House of Representatives) (noting that the Turtle
Mountain Band of Chippewa Indians would like to assert tribal water rights and quantify those
rights).
40. See discussion infra Part II (discussing the historical background of Indian water rights,
the process of quantification through negotiation, and the benefits and risks of quantification).
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development of this area of law, the process of quantifying the right, and
the positive and negative aspects of quantification for states and tribes.41
Part III examines the attempts of the North Dakota Legislature to create
legislation that will guide negotiations between the state and tribes to
quantify tribal water rights.42 Further, Part III addresses Montana’s method
of quantification as a model for creating legislation in North Dakota by
examining the historical development of that system and the creation of a
commission to negotiate tribal water rights.43 Finally, Part III considers
whether the Montana model can be effective in North Dakota.44 In conclusion, Part IV focuses on the future of the quantification of tribal water
rights in North Dakota.45
II. WHAT IS QUANTIFICATION?
Quantification is a process whereby a fixed amount of water is assigned to a holder of a water right.46 For the purpose of quantification, water is
generally measured in acre-feet.47 The quantification of water rights usually takes place in a process called general stream adjudications, or a determination of all rights to one source of water whether a lake, river, or underground aquifer.48 Quantification is triggered by one party asserting a water
right.49 When that right is asserted, the court or other regulatory body
orders an examination of all other rights on that body of water.50 In order to
quantify one holder’s right, all other rights must also be quantified.51

41. Id.
42. See discussion infra Part III.A (examining Senate Bill 2115 and House Bill 1025, previous attempts by the North Dakota Legislature to create a statutory guideline for quantification).
43. See discussion infra Part III.B (considering the Montana method of negotiation).
44. See discussion infra Part III.C (examining the benefits and risks to using the Montana
model of quantification in North Dakota).
45. See discussion infra Part IV (discussing the future of tribal water rights and quantification in the state of North Dakota).
46. GETCHES, supra note 2, at 330-44.
47. GERALD L. WESTESEN & MICHELLE BRYAN, WADING INTO MONTANA WATER RIGHTS
11 (1997), available at http://water.montana.edu/topics/policy/manuals/rights.pdf. One acre-foot
is equal to 325,851 cubic feet. Id.
48. McGovern, supra note 30, at 195. Courts are charged with presiding over general stream
adjudications. Id. at 197. Historically, general stream adjudications were the only way tribal
water rights were quantified; however, today tribal water rights are often quantified through
negotiation. Id.
49. See id. (indicating that water rights are settled in general stream adjudications whereby
states come up with a “hydrologically sound method of quantification” upon the assertion of the
tribes’ water rights). But see MONT. CONST. art. IX, § 3 (mandating quantification of all federal
water rights in the state, therefore making Montana different in the way that the state government
requires quantification and it is not started by a party asserting a right).
50. See Dana Smith, Doctrinal Anachronism?: Revisiting the Practicably Irrigable Acreage
Standard in Light of International Law for the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 22 ARIZ. J. INT’L &
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General stream adjudications often involve the quantification of both
federal and state water rights.52 Water rights held under federal law are
called federal reserved water rights because those rights arise from the federal government setting aside land for a federal purpose.53 Lands set aside
for Indian tribes as reservations are entitled to enough water to fulfill the
purpose of that land, as are lands set aside for other federal reserves including national parks, monuments, and preserves.54 However, quantifying federal reserved water rights is more difficult than state rights because courts
or decision makers must decide what amount of water will fulfill the current
and future needs of the reserved land.55 Tribal water rights are often even
more difficult to determine because of the nature of the relationship
between the federal government and federally recognized Indian tribes and
the complex and continuing development of tribal water law.56 To better
understand the path that led to the complexities in this area of law, an
ination of the historical background of tribal water rights is necessary.57
A. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
It would be impossible to understand the concept of tribal reserved
water rights without first understanding the historical and judicial occurrences that developed and confused this area of law.58 In the 1800s, the
COMP. 691, 701 (2005) (stating that the United States can only be named a party to a
comprehensive proceeding—one including all of the parties necessary to a controversy).
51. Id.
52. McGovern, supra note 30, at 195. Most water rights are state rights, with the exception
of federal reserved water rights. NATHAN BROOKS, INDIAN RESERVED WATER RIGHTS: AN
OVERVIEW 2 (2005) (Cong. Res. Service Rep. For Cong.). Federal reserved water rights are held
by tribes and other federal entities. Id.
53. BROOKS, supra note 52, at 2 (citing Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 138
(1976)).
54. Id. For the purpose of distinguishing the federal reserved water rights of tribes and nontribal reserves, water rights belonging to American Indians will be referred to as “tribal water
rights.” See supra note 14 and accompanying text (explaining the use of the term “tribal water
rights”).
55. See Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 600 (1963) (recommending the practicably
irrigable acre as a standard to determine quantified tribal water rights), overruled on other grounds
by Arizona v. California, 376 U.S. 340 (1964), amended by 383 U.S. 268 (1966); Winters v.
United States, 207 U.S. 564, 577-78 (1908) (holding that tribes are entitled to enough water to
fulfill the purpose of the reservation). “Decision makers” refers to the notion that in a negotiation,
the individuals determining a quantified amount of water to fulfill present and future needs will be
state and tribal officials rather than judges or courts. BROOKS, supra note 52, at 14.
56. Checchio & Colby, supra note 11, at 183.
57. See discussion infra Part II.A (delineating the historical background, including Winters v.
United States and Arizona v. California, that contributed to the complexity of in this area of law).
58. See Jessica Bacal, The Shadow of Lone Wolf: Native Americans Confront Risks of
Quantification of Their Reserved Water Rights, 12 U. BRIDGEPORT L. REV. 1, 7 (1991) (stating
that an understanding of the historical development of the quantification of tribal water rights is
necessary to understand the concept).
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federal government and many Indian tribes signed treaties providing that
the tribes would surrender most of the land under tribal control in exchange
for smaller parcels of land called reservations.59 Many of the tribes believed that these treaties would preserve tribal rights on the reservations,
unless expressly excluded in the agreements.60 Among the rights believed
to be preserved were the rights to natural resources, namely water, within
and adjacent to the newly reserved lands.61 However, years later, disputes
would arise regarding whether the tribes abandoned the right to water by
not specifically reserving water in the treaties formulated between the tribal
and federal governments.62
Although tribal water rights arose out of the treaties of the 1800s,
Winters v. United States63 was the first formal recognition of those rights.64
The significance of this case led to tribal water rights often being referred to
as “Winters rights.”65 In this 1908 landmark decision, the Supreme Court
created the reserved water rights doctrine, holding that when Congress set
aside land for a reservation, it also impliedly reserved water to help
transform the tribe into a “pastoral and civilized people.”66 The dispute in
Winters arose over diversions being made from the Milk River by nonIndian users, causing insufficient water for a tribal irrigation project.67 The
non-Indian users argued that the waters in dispute had been given up along
with land in the treaty, and that subsequently, the non-Indian users’ right to

59. Act of May 1, 1888, ch. 213, 25 Stat. 113 (1888). See Checchio & Colby, supra note 11,
at 182 (stating that after the Act of May 1, 1888, tribes began surrendering land through treaties in
return for reserved land).
60. BOBROFF ET AL., supra note 14, at 1183.
61. Checchio & Colby, supra note 11, at 182.
62. See Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 576 (1908) (arguing against the tribe by
saying that the land formerly under their control was exchanged for arid land and that the tribes
knowingly did not reserve water to irrigate the land or preserve hunting, agriculture, or
civilization).
63. 207 U.S. 564 (1908).
64. See Winters, 207 U.S. at 577 (holding that when the United States government set aside
land for reservations, water was also set aside to support those reservations).
65. WILLIAM C. CANBY, JR., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW IN A NUTSHELL 431 (4th ed. 2004).
66. Winters, 207 U.S. at 576. The disagreement in the Winters decision arose out of treaties
between the federal government reserving land that became known as the Fort Belknap
Reservation (Ft. Belknap). Id. at 567. The federal government argued that, because the Indians
of Ft. Belknap did not reserve water from the Milk River, in the treaty in question, along with the
land, no right to the water existed. Id. at 566. The Court, viewing the interpretation of the
agreement and resolving all ambiguities in favor of the American Indians as required by law,
resolved that a reservation of water was implicit in the federal government’s land reserve. Id. at
576. This quantity of water was defined as water adequate to fulfill the purpose of the reservation
of the land, “to change [the] habits [of the Indians] to become a pastoral and civilized people.” Id.
67. Id. at 566-67.
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water could only be perfected under the state prior appropriation doctrine.68
The Court disagreed, stating:
The Indians had command of the lands and the waters,—command
of all their beneficial use, whether kept for hunting, ‘and grazing
roving herds of stock,’ or turned to agriculture and the arts of
civilization. Did they give up all this? Did they reduce the area of
their occupation and give up the waters which made it valuable or
adequate? . . . If it were possible to believe affirmative answers,
we might also believe that the Indians were awed by the power of
the [g]overnment or deceived by its negotiators.69
The Court further stated that for the purpose of prior appropriation, the
priority date of Winters rights was the same as the date the reservation was
established, meaning the reservation’s water rights would predate nearly all
other water rights.70 Further, because the water rights recognized in
Winters were not created under state law, the requirement of continued
beneficial use was not applicable.71 In short, under Winters, tribes owned a
water right senior to all other rights that entitled tribes to enough water for
present and future use.72 No continued beneficial use is required to maintain that right.73
While the Winters decision changed the face of tribal water rights and
the rights of current appropriators under state law, the actual implications of
the Winters holding did not surface until decades later.74 The United States
sought litigation in federal court as a trustee for the tribes only in a few
cases.75 The result of those suits ended in shortfalls for the tribes.76 The
68. Id. at 567. See supra text accompanying note 20 (explaining the prior appropriation
doctrine).
69. Winters, 207 U.S. at 576 (quoting Act of May, 1888, ch. 213, 25 Stat. 113 (1888)).
70. Id. at 577; see Checchio & Colby, supra note 11, at 182 (stating that the priority date
established by treaty formation predates almost all priority dates assigned to non-Indian water
users).
71. See BOBROFF ET AL., supra note 14, at 1184 (“Indian water rights are not quantified by
the amount actually and continuously diverted to a beneficial use.”).
72. Winters, 207 U.S. at 576-77.
73. BOBROFF ET AL., supra note 14, at 1184.
74. Steven J. Shupe, Water in Indian Country: From Paper Rights to a Managed Resource,
57 U. COLO. L. REV. 561, 563 (1986). Tribal water rights were changed because the Winters
Court recognized that tribes held a right superior to that of current appropriators. Id. Even though
the non-Indian water users had diverted the water first, Winters rights were not subject to state
law and superseded water rights under state jurisdiction. Id. For a period of time, few cases were
heard where tribal water rights were asserted, but as tribal leaders began to ask for these rights to
be quantified, states were caught in a difficult position. Id. Water users had been diverting water
for decades and water projects had been developed despite the knowledge that the water may be
reserved under Winters for a nearby tribe. Id. This led to heated adjudications, where states could
only aid one party at the expense of the other. Id. at 567-68.
75. Id. at 563.
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shortfalls caused tribes to be reluctant to assert water rights. Additionally,
states continued to appropriate water with little or no consideration of
Winters rights.77 Further, the federal government took little action in its
role as trustee for the tribes.78 After Winters, the federal government continued to appropriate money to non-Indian water development projects
while making no attempt to define or ensure tribal water rights.79
The recognition of tribal water rights in Winters did little to advance
the water interests of American Indians.80 Parties resisted quantifying water
rights in federal court because of the failure of the federal government in
the role of trustee and the Court’s lack of clarification regarding Winters
rights.81 However, nearly fifty years later, the face of tribal reserved water
rights changed drastically.82
In 1952, Congress passed the McCarran Amendment further complicating the adjudication of federal reserved water rights.83 Previously, both
the tribes and the federal government were protected by the doctrine of
sovereign immunity, and therefore neither was subjected to state proceedings regarding Winters rights.84 The McCarran Amendment, however,

76. Id. Because reserved water rights were a result of federal law, for nearly fifty years
following the Winters decision, federal reserved water rights were heard in federal court. Michael
C. Blumm et al., The Mirage of Indian Reserved Water Rights and Western Streamflow
Restoration in the McCarran Amendment Era: A Promise Unfulfilled, 36 ENVTL. LAW 1157, 1160
(2006). For those cases that were pursued federally, receiving less than “the full entitlement” in
these adjudications may be one of the reasons that Winters rights were so rarely sought after
Winters. Id.
77. Williams, supra note 12, at 38.
78. See Shupe, supra note 74, at 564 (citing a letter from the Solicitor of the Department of
the Interior to President Nixon which concluded that federal water project dollars “[had] been
spent for ill-advised irrigation projects which have benefited the whites rather than the Indians,
without the consent of the tribe”).
79. Id. at 563.
80. Id.
81. McGovern, supra note 30, at 196.
82. See Public Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. § 666 (2000) (waiving the sovereign immunity previously protecting the United States from being sued regarding federal reserved water rights); Col.
River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 811 (1976) (interpreting 43 U.S.C.
§ 666 as a waiver on federal and tribal immunity and therefore providing for the adjudication of
federal water rights in state court).
83. 43 U.S.C. § 666.
84. BROOKS, supra note 52, at 4. Sovereign immunity is the immunity held by federal, state,
and tribal governments that prevents those governments from being sued without their consent.
BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY 766 (8th ed. 2004). Indian reserved water rights are a product of
federal creation and definition. See Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 577 (1908) (holding
that Indian reserved water rights arose out of treaties between the federal and tribal governments
creating reservations). Therefore, adjudication of these rights fell under federal jurisdiction. See
28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2008) (stating that the federal district courts have jurisdiction over all disputes
arising under the Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States); 28 U.S.C. § 1362 (stating
that federal district courts have jurisdiction over all lawsuits brought by an Indian tribe when the
dispute involves the United States Constitution, laws, or treaties between Indian tribes and the
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waived the sovereign immunity previously protecting the United States in
any adjudication:
(1) for the adjudication of rights to the use of water of a river
system or other source, or (2) for the administration of such rights,
where it appears that the United States is the owner of or is in the
process of acquiring water rights by appropriation under [s]tate
law, by purchase, by exchange, or otherwise, and the United States
is a necessary party to such a suit.85
The McCarran Amendment’s impact on federal reserved water rights
did not take full effect until a 1976 Supreme Court decision, Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United States.86 The court in Colorado
interpreted the amendment as allowing state courts to adjudicate tribal water
rights when the federal government has been joined in the litigation as
trustee for the tribe.87 The United States Supreme Court granted state
courts procedural jurisdiction to adjudicate the federal reserved water rights
according to federal law.88 Because the development of water law falls
under state power, no federal substantive water law exists, and water adjudication would be in the hands of state courts with little or no guidance
from the Supreme Court or the federal government.89 For many tribes, state
courts were considered “hostile territory.”90 Tribal leaders were no more
willing to risk tribal water rights in state court than they had been in federal
court prior to the amendment.91
In 1963, Arizona v. California92 offered further clarification regarding
the quantification of tribal water rights.93 In Winters, reservations had been
United States). A lawsuit regarding Indian water rights would involve both the federal government in its role as trustee for the tribes and the tribal government, both of which are immune from
suit unless Congress authorizes the suit or the tribe waives its immunity. Kiowa Tribe v. Mfg.
Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 754 (1998); Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation v.
World Eng’g, P.C., 476 U.S. 877, 890-91 (1986).
85. 43 U.S.C. § 666(a). With regard to Indian water rights, the McCarran Amendment was a
congressional authorization for Indian water rights to be heard in state courts and sovereign
immunity to be waived on behalf of both the federal and tribal governments. Id.
86. 424 U.S. 800, 811 (1976) [hereinafter Colorado].
87. Colorado, 424 U.S. at 812; see 43 U.S.C. § 666(a) (codifying the McCarren Amendment,
which was interpreted to be a waiver of federal and tribal sovereign immunity).
88. Colorado, 424 U.S. at 811.
89. McGovern, supra note 30, at 201-02.
90. BOBROFF ET AL., supra note 14, at 1211.
91. See BROOKS, supra note 52, at 4 (stating that the state court was viewed as “hostile
territory” and many tribes chose to pursue negotiated settlements to avoid state courts).
92. 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
93. See Arizona, 373 U.S. at 599, overruled on other grounds by Arizona v. California, 376
U.S. 340 (1964), amended by 383 U.S. 368 (1966) (establishing agriculture as the purpose of a
reservation and the practicably irrigable acreage standard as a means to quantify tribal water
rights).
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assured enough water to fulfill the purpose for which the land was set
aside.94 Making the most “significant contribution to the quantification
debate,” the Arizona Court held that the purpose of the reservation was
agriculture.95 The Court created a formula to quantify tribal water rights
called the practicably irrigable acreage standard.96 Under the formula,
Winters rights were determined to be equal to the amount of water it would
take to irrigate the land within a reservation that could be practicably irrigated.97 The practicably irrigable acreage standard only pertained to reservations that were established for the purpose of agriculture.98 However,
until recently, courts have deemed the purpose of all reservations to be
agriculture.99 From a practical standpoint, practicably irrigable acreage had
become the standard in quantification.100
Courts continue to prefer to use the practicably irrigable acreage standard when quantifying tribal water rights, despite the fact that the standard
has undergone sharp criticism.101 Critics argue that the standard does not
take into account the fact that many tribes no longer or may never have had
an agricultural purpose and that modern times call for water needs as
diversified as reservations’ geographies and purposes.102 One court agreed,
holding that the purpose of a reservation is not agriculture, but rather to
establish a “permanent home” for American Indians.103

94. Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 577 (1908).
95. Arizona, 373 U.S. at 600; BROOKS, supra note 52, at 6.
96. BROOKS, supra note 52, at 6. The Supreme Court did not give a specific formula for
determining practicably irrigable acreage, but lower courts created a process to determine the
practicably irrigable acreage of a reservation. Id. To determine irrigable acreage, soil scientists
begin by formulating the amount of land that could be irrigated on a reservation. Id. at 6-7. Next,
engineers consider the water supply available along with the amount of land that can be successfully irrigated to develop an amount of land that could be irrigated in a practical manner. Id. at 7.
Finally, the benefits to agriculture created by an irrigation project on that land, crop patterns,
yields, and profits are all considered as a part of the larger scheme as to what land could
reasonably be used for agricultural purposes. Id.
97. Arizona, 373 U.S. at 601.
98. Id. at 600-01.
99. BROOKS, supra note 52, at 5. But see In re Gen. Adjudication of all Rights to Use of
Water in the Gila River Sys. & Source, 35 P.3d 68, 74 (Ariz. 2002) (holding that the purpose for
one tribe was to provide a “permanent home and abiding place” rather than for agriculture).
100. BROOKS, supra note 52, at 7. The practicably irrigable acreage standard is “by far the
favorite judicial method for quantifying Indian reserved water rights.” Id. at 6.
101. See id. (stating that the practicably irrigable acreage standard is preferred by courts);
McGovern, supra note 30, at 205-08 (predicting that the practicably irrigable acreage standard
may become a part of the past rather than the future of quantifying tribal water rights, due to its
inability to adapt to changing times and purposes of reservations).
102. BROOKS, supra note 52, at 7.
103. In re Gen. Adjudication of All Rights to Use of Water in the Gila River Sys. & Source,
35 P.3d at 74.
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Although the practicably irrigable acreage standard continues to be the
principal method of quantification of tribal water rights, there has been
sharp criticism and debate regarding its use.104 For tribes negotiating water
rights, the standard is often used as a bargaining tool in the negotiation
process.105 If state leaders resist making what tribes consider to be a fair
agreement over water, the threat of proceeding with litigation where the
practicably irrigable acreage standard will be used may persuade state
officials to reconsider.106 Under the standard, states in arid western regions
could see significant quantities of water claimed by American Indians.107
Arizona became the conduit to the extensive adjudication, negotiation,
and management efforts that began what is called the “modern era” of tribal
water rights.108 Although this modern era consisted primarily of litigation
in the beginning, eventually both tribes and states began pursuing negotiated settlements.109 Settlements proved to be a more viable option for many
reasons, one of which was that settling water disputes provided a forum for

104. McGovern, supra note 30, at 205. The practicably irrigable acreage standard has been
criticized as both overgenerous and insufficient. Id. at 207-08. Before application of the standard,
an analysis of the tribe’s purpose is required to determine if the standard will even apply. Id. at
208. Determining the purpose of the tribe is difficult because it requires considering the relationship of agriculture to other purposes and a determination of what constitutes the “purpose.” Id.
For many years, courts held that the purpose of all tribes was agriculture; however more recently
there has been a trend towards identifying other purposes. See In re Gen. Adjudication of All
Rights to Use of Water in the Gila River Sys. & Source, 35 P.3d at 74 (holding that the purpose of
an Indian reservation was not agriculture, but instead to provide a “permanent home and abiding
place”). In the event that a non-agricultural purpose is identified, the practicably irrigable acreage
standard does not apply at all and courts are left to determine a water quantity with no guidance.
See Arizona, 373 U.S. at 600 (holding that tribal water rights for agrarian tribes can be measured
by the practicably irrigable acreage standard and that although the water quantified may be used
for non-agriculture purposes, practicably irrigable acreage does not apply if the non-agriculture
purposes are deemed to be the tribe’s primary purpose). Further, when the standard is used, it
altogether ignores municipal water needs, population, industry, and development, all of which
necessitate water. BROOKS, supra note 52, at 7. Because of this, it can be argued that this standard does not honor Congress’ intent—an intent that included enough water for current and future
uses with no mention of the need for that water to be tied to a purpose. See Winters v. United
States, 207 U.S. 564, 577 (1908) (defining the amount of water to be adequate for both present
and future needs, with no recognition that not all of these needs tie to agriculture).
105. McGovern, supra note 30, at 206.
106. See id. (asserting that the practicably irrigable acreage standard puts tribes in a “powerful bargaining position” regarding reserved water rights).
107. See Williams, supra note 12, at 38 (stating that the practicably irrigable acreage standard could benefit tribes in arid regions because the amount of land that is irrigable may be greater
than the needs of the tribe).
108. Shupe, supra note 74, at 564.
109. See Checchio & Colby, supra note 11, at 184 (stating that general stream adjudications
are often started because of the intense amount of demands on western water and that those
adjudications facilitated the trend toward negotiated settlements).
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a meeting of the minds between state and tribal leaders and required less
resources than adjudication.110
Litigation had proven to be a costly endeavor both in time and
money.111 Water adjudications in state courts took years and resulted in the
expenditure of millions of dollars by both states and tribes.112 Furthermore,
the years spent in state courtrooms often resulted in damaged relationships
between tribal and state governments.113 Litigating tribal water rights
caused a great deal of turmoil without advancing the goals of either party. 114
In litigation, parties did not talk about issues other than arriving at a quantity of water that belonged to the tribe.115 The management, regulation, and
preservation of water were not considered to be a part of the adjudication.116
In addition to the shortfalls of litigation, the federal government began
encouraging parties to negotiate settlements of Winters rights.117 Now,
most water adjudications end up in state court only as a last resort.118 Both
the state and tribes believe the risks and expenditures of litigation are too
great.119 This belief has caused a trend in states and Indian parties choosing
to quantify water rights by negotiating an agreement.120

110. Id. See, e.g., In re Gen. Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Big Horn River
Sys., 835 P.2d 273 (Wyo. 1992); In re Gen. Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Big
Horn River Sys., 803 P.2d 61 (Wyo. 1990), rehearing denied, Wyoming v. United States, 492
U.S. 406 (1989); In re Gen. Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Big Horn River Sys.,
753 P.2d 76, 83 (Wyo. 1989) (beginning the adjudication of the Big Horn River in state court),
cert. granted, Wyoming v. U.S., 488 U.S. 1040 (1989), aff’d, 492 U.S. 406 (1989), rehearing
denied, 492 U.S. 938 (1989). The Gila River adjudication lasted for nearly twenty years. Brienza,
supra note 31, at 167. There were over 20,000 parties and costs of over $13 million in the first
decade. Id.
111. BOBROFF ET AL., supra note 14, at 1211.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. See id. at 1215 (stating that goals such as the use of groundwater, the administration of
water, and a management plan were not a part of litigation).
115. See id. at 1184 (inferring that other issues were not settled in court disputes by saying
that one of the reasons for the shift towards negotiated settlements is the fact that negotiators are
able to address issues other than quantity, such as “promises of assistance in delivering the water
to the reservation”).
116. See id. at 1215 (stating that litigation only accomplishes arrival at a specified quantity of
water, whereas negotiated settlements will allow for issues such as the delivery, development, and
management of water to also be addressed).
117. Id. at 1214.
118. BROOKS, supra note 52, at 14.
119. See supra notes 115-16 and accompanying text (stating that today quantification is
achieved through negotiated settlements).
120. Id.

2008]

NOTE

469

B. NEGOTIATING TRIBAL WATER RIGHTS
Today, the quantification of tribal water rights occurs primarily at a
negotiating table, rather than in a courtroom.121 Many states and tribes prefer to negotiate rather than adjudicate Indian water rights for a variety of
reasons.122 First, negotiation allows tribes more involvement and flexibility.123 Tribes can seek quantification with the specific needs of their tribe
in mind. For example, a tribe might focus on municipal water needs, developing projects that may require water, agricultural needs, economic development, or a combination of these and other needs.124
Second, negotiation addresses the specific needs of the involved parties
in a way that adjudication was unable to do.125 In a courtroom, there is a
lack of guidance regarding the quantification of Indian water rights except
for a few vague rules.126 When looking to other states for persuasive
authority, courts find directly conflicting holdings, confusing processes, and
political climates that may have affected the rules.127 However, negotiation
allows all parties much wider latitude to pursue common goals occurring
within the borders of the state.128
Many issues are still unsettled in the arena of Indian water rights, including: (1) whether Winters rights include a right to ground water; and, (2)
whether tribes, the state, or a combination of the two will manage water
resources after quantification.129 To date, four compacts have demonstrated
the acceptance that Indian tribes possess a right to groundwater by
121. Shupe, supra note 74, at 562.
122. See discussion supra Part II.A (discussing the reasons tribes prefer to negotiate rather
than litigate Winters rights).
123. See McGovern, supra note 30, at 197 (elaborating on additional terms that tribes can
negotiate as part of settlement to tailor the agreement to their specific needs). Some settlements
have addressed issues that are unresolved in law such as groundwater and management. BOBROFF
ET AL., supra note 14, at 1214-15.
124. See McGovern, supra note 30, at 197 (stating that tribes can negotiate with the “particular needs and circumstances” specific to that tribe in mind).
125. See supra note 116 and accompanying text (communicating that, because negotiation
allows tribal governments the ability to focus on the particular water needs of their individual
tribes, many tribes are choosing negotiation rather than litigation).
126. See Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 601 (1963) (stating that tribes are entitled to
enough water for future and present use, and if the purpose of the reservation is agriculture,
quantification of the water should be formulated with the practicably irrigable acreage standard);
Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 577-78 (1908) (stating that tribes are entitled to water to
satisfy the purpose of the reservation).
127. See generally BROOKS, supra note 52, at 5-8 (detailing the maze of court decisions that
left tribal water rights in a state of confusion); see also Brienza, supra note 31, at 172 (describing
that negotiation better allows for the preservation of relationships between the state and tribal
leaders).
128. BOBROFF ET AL., supra note 14, at 1211.
129. See supra note 116 and accompanying text (articulating the reasons tribes prefer to
negotiate rather than litigate Winters rights).
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including a tribal right to groundwater in settlements.130 In the negotiations
of those four compacts, the parties were able to settle an issue courts have
been unable to resolve.131 With common goals and compromise, negotiated
settlements often lead to better results than courtroom adjudications.132
Preparing for a negotiation of federal reserved water rights requires the
consideration of many factors.133 In order to begin a negotiation, states
must first identify the person or persons that will negotiate on behalf of the
state, the resources that will facilitate a negotiation and handle the necessary
preliminary analyses, and form working relationships with the entities involved.134 Although there is no wrong way to conduct a negotiation, consideration must be given to factors such as the relationships and motivation
of the parties.135 It is these intangible factors that are often the source of
failure.136 For the parties, it is necessary to understand both the risks and
benefits of quantification because, whether through adjudication or the
negotiation of a water settlement, the results of quantification are permanent
and there are no second chances.137
C. THE RISKS AND BENEFITS OF QUANTIFICATION
North Dakota leaders have started to work toward developing a process
to negotiate water settlements with Indian tribes. However, consideration
should be given to whether the timing is right and whether both parties
possess the necessary resources to accomplish the task.138 Quantification
should take place “when the situation ripens by the presence of a strong
desire to settle water rights in a basin, a sense of urgency is present, and the
key players are involved.”139 Leaders of Turtle Mountain have a strong

130. BOBROFF ET AL., supra note 14, at 1215.
131. See Jan. 12, 2006, Minutes of Interim Comm. on Agriculture and Natural Res., 2005
Leg., 59th Interim Sess. 2-3 (N.D. 2006) [hereinafter Jan. 12, 2006, Minutes] (statement of Clive
J. Strong, Idaho Chief Assistant Att. Gen.) (stating that negotiating to achieve common goals
advances the interests of both parties).
132. BOBROFF ET AL., supra note 14, at 1211.
133. See Jan. 12, 2006, Minutes, supra note 131, at 2-3 (statement of Clive J. Strong, Idaho
Chief Assistant Attorney General) (explaining that when preparing to negotiate, one must decide
who will negotiate, identify the resources, consider the relationships, and develop protocols and
goals, along with other considerations in preparation for quantification).
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. See discussion infra Part II.C (explaining the risks and benefits of quantifying tribal
water rights).
138. See Williams, supra note 12, at 37 (stating that South Dakota, as a western state, should
carefully consider whether it has the proper resources for quantification).
139. Jan. 12, 2006, Minutes, supra note 131, at 1 (testimony of Clive J. Strong, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Idaho Attorney General’s Office).
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desire to quantify tribal water rights and feel that the need for quantification
for their tribe is urgent.140 However, other tribes have not been quick to
follow Turtle Mountain and view quantification as premature at best.141
Without the other tribes’ support, it has become apparent that a process to
adjudicate water rights may only be a dream.142
Although the leaders of Turtle Mountain see the quantification of the
tribe’s water rights as the mechanism through which it can become selfsustaining, the remaining North Dakota tribes do not feel prepared to
quantify water rights and face the dangers that come with the process.143
Quantification is daunting for tribes because no ability to revisit the amount
of water arrived at exists.144 Once tribes have made an agreement with the
state regarding water, it is final and cannot be amended according to changing needs.145 Tribal governments struggle with quantifying an amount of
water to serve the tribe for all time because, amongst tribal members, there
is a sense that all of the water in or near the reservation belongs to the
tribe.146
Further, quantification can lead to disputes or disparities regarding the
management of water resources following quantification, often leaving the
tribe without a means to transport or utilize the water that has just been
quantified.147 North Dakota leaders are concerned about the management
of water after quantification.148 Tribal leaders are also concerned, but their
apprehension involves whether quantification could actually result in a

140. See Hearing on H B. 1025, supra note 1, at 12-14 (statement of Tom Davis, Water
Resources Director for Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa Indians) (testifying that water
problems in Rollette County have forced Turtle Mountain to request quantification of the tribe’s
water rights).
141. See discussion infra Parts III.A.1-2 (discussing the sentiment of the Missouri River
tribes that neither Standing Rock nor Fort Berthold are considering quantification).
142. See discussion infra Parts III.A.1-2 (demonstrating that without tribal support,
legislation will not pass).
143. See McGovern, supra note 30, at 207-12 (stating that quantification must be
comprehensive, and addressing it in court will likely leave unresolved issues such as how the
resource will be managed).
144. See Williams, supra note 12, at 37 (noting that tribal water rights are quantified “for all
time”).
145. Id.
146. See id. (stating that elders are often reluctant to use the “white man’s system” to
quantify water rights because the tribe will end up with “drops of the water that really all belongs
to the tribal people”).
147. BOBROFF ET AL., supra note 14, at 1219.
148. Jan. 12, 2006, Minutes, supra note 131, at 3 (testimony of Clive J. Strong, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Idaho Attorney General’s Office).
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shortfall for their tribes and whether the tribes will ever attain the right to
regulate their own water.149
Quantification of federal reserved water rights is quintessential to the
management of water for both North Dakota and the affected tribes.150 Left
unquantified, tribes in the state do not actually have “wet” water and instead
will be left with only the “paper” water rights granted to them under the
Winters doctrine.151 For states, quantification will make the water entitlement of tribes static and allow the state to continue to develop water regulation and new projects.152
North Dakota tribes will be able to use the water for the needs of the
reservation, and if excess exists, sell it to other users.153 Tribes also see
water as imperative to creating thriving tribal economies.154 Receiving
“wet” water may allow tribes the ability to manage the reservation’s water
resource in a way that best represents tribal customs and goals.155 Further,
quantification will provide protection for the tribes from the federal government.156 Quantification forces the government to formally recognize water
as tribal property and allows for non-tribal use only upon tribal agreement
and the development of a contract.157
For the state of North Dakota, quantification of federal reserved water
rights will allow for the future management of water resources.158 After
quantification, the amount of water belonging to Indian tribes and other federal reserved water rights holders will be solidified and permanent, giving

149. Hearing on S B. 2115, supra note 37, at 14 (statement of Tom Davis, Water Resources
Director for Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa Indians). “Three Affiliated Tribes are very
cautious about blessing any process concerning the quantification of their water rights.” Id.
“Water is something that can do wonders for the tribe. [We] want to become self sufficient. [We]
need to be able to move waters to accommodate this.” Id.
150. See MCCOOL, supra note 37, at 101 (stating that without quantification all tribes have is
the promise of water, but no actual water); see also supra note 37 and accompanying text
(explaining the concept of “paper” and “wet” water).
151. MCCOOL, supra note 37, at 101.
152. See Williams, supra note 12, at 37 (stating that quantification is permanent). Quantifying water rights will protect tribes by preventing non-tribal use, but it will also protect the states
by precluding them from appropriating water for development that may later be ruled property of
Indian tribes. Id.
153. STEPHEN L. PEVAR, THE RIGHTS OF INDIANS AND TRIBES: THE AUTHORITATIVE
ACLU GUIDE TO INDIAN AND TRIBAL RIGHTS 248 (3d. ed. 2002).
154. See Jane Marx et al., Tribal Jurisdiction Over Reservation Water Quality and Quantity,
43 S.D. L. REV. 315, 316 (1998) (“Tribal governments understand all too well that the availability
of good water and ability of the tribes to control its use and protect it from degradation is
absolutely necessary for viable tribal economies.”) (emphasis added).
155. Id.
156. PEVAR, supra note 153, at 248.
157. Id. at 247-48.
158. McGovern, supra note 30, at 196.
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the state the ability to more adequately plan future water development.159
Furthermore, states like North Dakota continue to issue permits to appropriators causing the eventual assertion of tribal water rights to increasingly
become a source of conflict.160
Until tribal water rights are quantified, junior users will not be able to
rely upon state water rights granted under prior appropriation.161 Although
quantification will provide permanence that will allow both the state and
tribes some sureties, quantification itself is a risk for junior rights holders.162 The quantified amount of water arrived at may be so large that it
displaces those with a perfected right under state law.163
Junior rights holders losing the right to water has a great impact on a
state like North Dakota.164 Agriculture is the number one industry in the
state.165 Agrarians from the state are dependent on water to grow crops,
raise livestock, and maintain operations.166 If even some of the water available to the agriculture community was no longer available after quantification, the impact on North Dakota’s economy would be devastating.167 The
reality for many farmers is that if the resources currently availed to them are
lost, they would be unable to withstand the financial burden of diverting
water from another source or purchasing water from neighboring tribes.168

159. Id.
160. PEVAR, supra note 153, at 248.
161. Karen Crass, Eroding the Winters Right: Non-Indian Water Users Attempt to Limit the
Scope of the Indian Superior Entitlement to Western Water to Prevent Tribes from Water
Brokering, 1 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 109, 114 (1997). State appropriation systems suffer from
being in a state of uncertainty due to the inability to account for tribal water rights that have not
been asserted. Id. This leaves a great deal of risk for non-Indian rights holders because their
dependency on currently appropriated water could be discontinued due to the assertion of superior
tribal water rights. Id.
162. Bacal, supra note 58, at 21-22. Water rights appropriated after land was set aside for a
reservation would fall subsequent to the rights held by the tribe. Id. For those who established a
water right under state law, there is a risk of being displaced when tribes assert their Winters
rights. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Christene A. Beaupre, Note, Product Safety—Food and Drug Laws: How Bates
Changed the Face of Preemption, 82 N.D. L. REV. 579, 602 (2006). Agriculture makes up 25%
of the state’s economic base and 24% of employment is agricultural in nature. Id. In 2002, agriculture brought over $3.6 billion in revenue to the state. Id. at 603.
166. See Chad A. West, For Body, Soul, or Wealth: The Distinction, Evolution, & Policy
Implications of Water Ethics, 26 STAN. ENVTL. L. J. 201, 221 (2007) (delineating the tie between
water and agriculture). Eighty-five percent of fresh water consumption is agricultural. Id.
167. See PEVAR, supra note 153, at 248 (discussing the impact that the depletion of water
resources could have on ranching and agriculture).
168. Id.

474

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

[VOL . 84:455

Another negative aspect of quantification, whether by litigation or
negotiation, is the intense demand it puts on state and tribal resources.169
The scope of quantifying water rights is both enormous and expensive.170
For example, the quantification of water on the Gila and Little Colorado
Rivers in Colorado has lasted over eight decades and involves approximately 27,000 parties and a price tag totaling millions of dollars.171
III. NORTH DAKOTA CONSIDERS NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENTS
Historically, the state of North Dakota has not seen a lawsuit regarding
a tribal water rights claim.172 However, problems ranging from flooding,
drought, and failure of municipal water systems over the past ten years have
assured that tribal water rights would become an issue.173 This section
examines quantification in the state of North Dakota, beginning with the
state’s previous attempts at enacting legislation to guide quantification.174
Further, this section considers the way the neighboring state of Montana
handles the quantification of tribal water rights to see if that process might
act as a model for North Dakota.175 Finally, the following question is
asked: Will the Montana model work in North Dakota?176

169. See BOBROFF, supra note 14, at 1219 (stating that litigation takes a great deal of time
and money).
170. PEVAR, supra note 153, at 249.
171. See id. at 249 (stating that the Gila River adjudication lasted over eight decades); see
also Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 812 (1971) (providing that state courts can hear tribal water adjudications even though the right is a federally
created right); Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 600 (1963) (stating that the purpose of the
tribe is agriculture and that a quantified water right will be determined by computing the acreage
of the reservation that can be practically irrigated); Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 576-78
(1908) (holding that when land was set aside for reservations, a right to water to support that land
was also reserved for the support of land); In re Gen. Adjudication of all Rights to Use of Water in
the Gila River Sys. & Source, 35 P.3d 68, 74 (Ariz. 2002) (holding that the purpose of a
reservation was not for agriculture, but instead to provide a homeland to tribes).
172. See Hearing on S B. 2115, supra note 37, at 18 (testimony of Dave Ripley, Director of
Water Appropriations Division, North Dakota Water Commission) (informing the Senate Natural
Resources Committee that the Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa Indians had requested to begin
a negotiation process, but to date no tribes have made attempts to quantify tribal water rights).
173. See supra note 4 and accompanying text (discussing the drought in the western part of
North Dakota and flooding in eastern North Dakota since the late nineties); Fort Yates Water
Drinkable—Finally, BISMARCK TRIB., Dec. 3, 2003, at 1A (reporting that the Standing Rock
Sioux Reservation ran out of water just days before Thanksgiving).
174. See discussion infra Part III.A (examining Senate Bill 2115 and House Bill 1025).
175. See discussion infra Part III.B (considering the Montana model of quantification).
176. See discussion infra Part III.C (addressing the possibility that the Montana model may
work in North Dakota).
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A. PREVIOUS ATTEMPTS AT LEGISLATION GOVERNING NEGOTIATED
SETTLEMENTS
In 1998, Turtle Mountain wrote a letter to the North Dakota State
Water Commission asking that the state participate in a water rights settlement with the tribe.177 Turtle Mountain leaders approached the commission
because of two primary concerns: (1) a depleting underground aquifer and
(2) a recent three-year period of flooding in the area where the reservation
is located.178 The leaders of Turtle Mountain concluded that the quantification was the only way to address the water problems facing the reservation.179 The request made by Turtle Mountain was met with the drafting of
Senate Bill 2115.180
1.

Senate Bill 2115

Senate Bill 2115 provided a mechanism through which Turtle
Mountain could negotiate the tribe’s reserved water rights with the State of
North Dakota.181 Section one of the bill provided that the state engineer
would negotiate tribal water rights on behalf of North Dakota with
representatives of the federally recognized tribe and the federal government
in the capacity of trustee.182 The bill also provided that the state engineer
would negotiate with the federal government regarding federal, non-tribal
water rights.183 Additionally, this section provided that public notice of all

177. Meeting Minutes of the North Dakota Water Comm. 1 (Dec. 10, 1998).
178. See Hearing on S B 2115, supra note 37, at 10 (stating that the Turtle Mountain
Reservation obtains water from an underground aquifer measuring fifty-five square miles); see
also Hearing on H B. 1025, supra note 1, at 12 (reporting on the water situation at Turtle
Mountain). The Turtle Mountain Reservation was experiencing extensive flooding and was
declared an emergency area five out of six years since the year 2000. Id. The damage done to
Rollette County and the reservation included millions of dollars in damage to roads and other
infrastructure. Id. Aside from flooding, the Turtle Mountain Reservation is concerned about the
quantity of water that will be available in the future. Id.
179. See Hearing on H B. 1025, supra note 1, at 14 (statement of Tom Davis, Water
Resources Director for Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa Indians) (providing that Turtle
Mountain needs to protect and manage water in order to advance agriculture, feed the reservation’s people, and become self sufficient).
180. S.B. 2115, 2005 Leg., 59th Sess. (N.D. 2005).
181. See Hearing on S B. 2115, supra note 37, at 18 (statement of Dave Ripley, Director of
Water Appropriations Division, North Dakota Water Commission) (stating that in the event tribes
want to quantify tribal water rights, Senate Bill 2115 will establish a process under which
quantification can take place).
182. S.B. 2115 § 1(1).
183. Id. Non-tribal federal reserved water rights consist of lands reserved by the federal
government for purposes other than the establishment of a American Indian reservation. Cappaert
v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 138 (1997). Examples of non-tribal entities that own a right to
water are national parks, monuments, and reserves. Id.
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negotiations was required and the public would have an opportunity to
provide input.184
Section two of Senate Bill 2115 dealt with the process the state would
follow after an agreement had been formulated between the tribes and the
state in order to create a formal, enforceable treaty to water rights.185 After
an agreement was drafted, it would be given to the governor for his or her
signature.186 Following the governor’s signature, the agreement would be
forwarded to the state engineer and authorized representatives of the agreeing tribe and the federal government as trustee for signature.187
However, if any holders of water rights object to the agreement, an
exception can be filed with the state engineer detailing that individual’s
objection.188 Then, the state engineer would notify all owners of water permits affected by the new agreement through written notice.189 Those rights
holders would then have the opportunity to file an exception to the agreement under the requirements set forth in section four of the bill.190 According to section four, before an agreement can take effect, several steps must
be taken.191
First, the state engineer must allow the time period allotted for
exceptions to be filed to lapse.192 Upon the filing of an exception, an
administrative law judge would be appointed by the state engineer to hear
the exception.193 The state engineer would file the agreement without
changes if the judge overruled the exceptions.194 However, if the administrative judge agreed with the exception filed by a state water right holder,
the agreement would be remanded to the negotiating parties for further
184. S.B. 2115 § 1(2).
185. Id. § 2.
186. Id. § 2(1).
187. Id. This section of Senate Bill 2115 also stated that the same signature process would
be used for federal, non-Indian reserved water rights by providing that the agreement would
require approval by the governor and signatures of both the state engineer and authorized
representatives of the federal government. Id. § 2(2).
188. Id. § 3.
189. Id.
190. Id. § 4(1). The state engineer will also provide time and form requirements for the
exception along with information on how to obtain a copy of the recently signed agreement. Id.
§ 3. Further, notice will be given by mail to the “last reasonably ascertainable address” of the
water rights holder. Id. Notice will be conducted following the North Dakota Rules of Civil
Procedure. Id.; see N.D. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(1)-(3) (2007) (detailing the process whereby notice is
given including delivery to a person of suitable age or an agent thereof).
191. S.B. 2115 § 4(1)-(4).
192. See id. § 4(1) (stating that the state engineer must allow owners of water rights, both
conditional and unconditional, to file exceptions).
193. Id. § 4(2). The state engineer can also request that the office of administrative hearings
designate a judge in the event he or she has conflicts with appointing a judge. Id.
194. Id. § 4(3).
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negotiation.195 In the event the agreement is remanded, the state engineer is
required to file an amended form of the agreement with the appointed
administrative law judge, whereby the judge either dismisses the proceedings without prejudice or asks for a continuance to negotiate.196 If an
amended agreement is reached, the state engineer would again be required
to notify all affected water rights owners and allow them the chance to
review the amended agreement and pose exceptions.197
Senate Bill 2115 quickly met backlash from the Standing Rock leaders
and other tribal leaders in the state.198 While North Dakota tribal leaders
supported the development of a negotiation process for Indian water rights
for Turtle Mountain, the state’s leaders expressed concern regarding the
process of developing Senate Bill 2115.199 Leaders of tribes other than
Turtle Mountain expressed disappointment that they had not been included
in the process of developing the bill and had not even received a copy of the
legislation until just days before the first committee hearing.200 However, it
was not only the neglect to include tribes other than Turtle Mountain in the
development of a process, but also the components of the bill that dismayed
tribal leaders.201

195. Id. § 4(4). Any additional negotiations that occur as the result of a sustained exception
must be done in accordance with sections one through five of the bill. See supra notes 182-94 and
accompanying text (discussing sections 1-5 of the bill).
196. S.B. 2115 § 5(1)-(3).
197. See id. § 5(1) (stating that an amended agreement must comply with section three and
four of the act requiring that notice be given to affect water rights owners and that the exceptions
be heard and ruled upon by the administrative law judge). In the event the judge sustains
exceptions on the amended agreement, it will again be presented for additional negotiation. See
id. § 4(4) (requiring further negotiation on sustained exceptions to the agreement).
198. See Hearing on S B. 2115, supra note 37, at 16-22 (testimony by Thomas M.
Disselhorst, Attorney, United Tribes Technical College; Tex Hall, Chairman, Mandan, Hidatsa
and Arikara Nation; and Charles W. Murphy, Chairman, Standing Rock Sioux Reservation)
(expressing concern regarding Senate Bill 2115 and asking that the bill not be passed). Leaders
from the Spirit Lake Sioux Nation did not participate in discussions of tribal water quantification
on Senate Bill 2115. See generally id. at 1-36 (containing no testimony from Spirit Lake
Reservation leaders).
199. See id. at 16-17 (testimony of Tex Hall, Chairman of the Mandan, Hidatsa and Arikara
Nation) (stating that the Mandan, Hidatsa and Arikara Nation supports legislation to negotiate
tribal water rights, but cannot be supportive of a bill that was not created with tribal input).
200. Id. at 21-22 (letter from Charles W. Murphy, Chairman, Standing Rock Sioux Tribe)
“[T]he bill does not proceed on a government-to-government basis. [The Standing Rock Sioux
Tribe has] in place an accord with the State of North Dakota that says this kind of legislation
should be developed in consultation with our Tribe, which did not occur in this case.” Id.
201. See id. at 16-17 (testimony of Tex Hall, Chairman, Mandan, Hidatsa and Arikara
Nation) (outlining the components of the bill that the Mandan, Hidatsa and Arikara Nation do not
support). Mr. Hall also objected to section four of the bill, which required an administrative
proceeding to resolve the issue of exceptions. Id. Further, Mr. Hall suggested that the bill require
ratification by the state legislature of any agreement between the State of North Dakota and a
tribal nation. Id. He also noted the bill’s failure to mention approval of a Tribal Council and
approval by the United States Congress, as a required part of the trust relationship. Id.
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Three other major concerns arose during the hearing on Senate Bill
2115.202 The first was that the negotiator for the state was the state
engineer.203 Although tribal leaders understood the importance of having
the state engineer and staff of the water commission involved, many noted
that a negotiation would benefit from having other individuals involved as
well.204 Because the quantification of tribal and other federal reserved
water rights will have an effect on people across the state, involving additional representatives would create a process whereby the outcome would
involve input from the different interests.205 Interests might include those
already using the water, developers in need of a water source, the tribes,
agrarians, and municipalities.206 Tribal leaders suggested using a commission that included representatives of the parties affected by the
adjudication.207
Second, even though the legislation did not require tribes to adjudicate
water rights, tribal leaders were concerned about the development of any
legislation that would form a precedent that tribes other than Turtle
Mountain would have to follow.208 Leaders from both the Standing Rock
and Fort Berthold Reservations believed their tribes were a long way from
being prepared to quantify tribal rights and therefore were unable to commit
to the proposed method delineated in Senate Bill 2115.209 The Standing
Rock and Fort Berthold Reservations wanted to preserve the ability to

202. Id.
203. Id. at 17 (statement of Tex Hall, Chairman, Mandan, Hidatsa and Arikara Nation).
204. Id. Mr. Hall did not mention the parties he felt should be involved in order to guarantee
a more fair process. Id. at 16-17.
205. See supra note 35 and accompanying text (stating that tribes, junior rights holders, and
state administrators have an interest in the results of quantification); see also notes 165-67 and
accompanying text (relaying the interest in the results of quantification for farmers).
206. See note 35 and accompanying text (describing the interests for junior rights holders,
state administrators, and the tribes); see also notes 165-67 and accompanying text (noting the
interest in the results of quantification for farmers because they rely upon water for their
business).
207. See Hearing on S B. 2115, supra note 37, at 17 (statement of Tex Hall, Chairman,
Mandan, Hidatsa and Arikara Nation) (“The [t]ribes’ initial thought is that it may be better to
negotiate with a body or perhaps a commission that would be fairly representative of the State
rather than with just one individual.”).
208. See id. at 21 (statement of Charles Murphy, Chairman, Standing Rock Sioux Tribe)
(“While I realize at least one North Dakota tribe is in favor of this process, this bill poses grave
risks for all North Dakota tribes that do not believe it is necessary at this time to quantify our
reserved water rights.”).
209. See id. (stating that Standing Rock Reservation is not interested in pursuing the
quantification of their tribal water rights at this time); id. at 17 (statement of Tex Hall, Chairman,
Mandan, Hidatsa and Arikara Nation) (requesting that the committee recommend a “DO NOT
PASS” on Senate Bill 2115).
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develop legislation that addressed the needs of the tribe—needs that they
felt were different from the needs of Turtle Mountain.210
Third, tribal leaders did not approve of the use of an administrative law
judge to rule on exceptions filed to a negotiated agreement.211 The Chairman of the Mandan, Hidatsa and Arikara Nation, Tex Hall, suggested that it
was contrary to North Dakota law to involve the administrative process and
that tribes had the right to have disagreements heard in state court.212 Still
uncomfortable with the prospects of a state court’s inability to balance state
and tribal needs, the chairman further suggested that the tribe pursuing
quantification and the state appoint a “Special Master” to hear the dispute
and enter a final order regarding the agreement.213
As a result, Senate Bill 2115 was amended into a bill ordering the
North Dakota Legislative Council (hereinafter N.D.L.C.)214 to study the
issue of tribal water rights during the interim legislative session.215 The
legislature asked N.D.L.C. to develop a proposal that would better suit the

210. See id. at 21-22 (statement of Charles Murphy, Chairman, Standing Rock Sioux Tribe)
(stating that the position of Standing Rock is different because the needs of Standing Rock include
a working municipal water system). But see Hearing on H B. 1025, supra note 1, at 12 (statement
of Tom Davis, Water Resources Director for Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa Indians)
(reporting that the problems on the Turtle Mountain Reservation stem from flooding); id.
(statement of Archie Full Bear, member of the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe) (stating that the Turtle
Mountain problem deals with an underground aquifer as a water source); Hearing on S B. 2115,
supra note 37, at 16 (statement of Tex Hall, Chairman, Mandan, Hidatsa and Arikara Nation)
(detailing that the Missouri River, rather than an aquifer, and its mismanagement have caused
water problems for the Standing Rock Sioux Reservation).
211. Hearing on S.B. 2115, supra note 37, at 17 (statement of Tex Hall, Chairman, Mandan,
Hidatsa and Arikara Nation).
212. Id.
213. Id. The term “Special Master” was used in Mr. Hall’s testimony. Id. The “Special
Master” would be chosen by the tribe and state together to hear any adjudicative proceedings
related to water disputes arising during quantification. Id. Mr. Hall proposed a “Special Master”
because of concerns that the state court would be more deferential towards the state’s wishes than
those of the tribes. Id. Mr. Hall believed that a “Special Master” to be chosen by both bodies
would result in a more fair process. Id.
214. North Dakota Legislative Council Home Page, http://www.legis.nd.gov/council/ (last
visited Jan. 23, 2007) (follow the “General” hyperlink; then follow the “Overview” hyperlink).
The N.D.L.C. is composed of seventeen legislators, including the majority and minority leaders of
both houses. Id. Additionally, six representatives are chosen in the senate by its leader, the
President of the Senate. Id. The lieutenant governor chooses three members of the majority and
three of the minority to sit on the Council. Id. The Speaker of the House chooses three minority
members and two majority members to serve on the Council. Id. This group is assisted in studying issues by the N.D.L.C. staff, and is composed of nonpartisan employees with backgrounds in
law, policy, and economics. Id.
215. 2005 N.D. LAWS ch. 510 § 1. The bill was amended to read: “The legislative council
shall consider studying, during the 2005-06 interim, the process to negotiate and quantify reserved
water rights. The legislative council shall report its findings and recommendations, together with
any legislation required to implement the recommendations, to the sixtieth legislative assembly.”
Id.
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needs of the tribe and state.216 Both state and tribal leaders supported the
amendment to study quantification.217 Senate Bill 2115 as amended passed
the North Dakota Legislature on March 21, 2005.218 In 2006, the Agriculture and Natural Resources Interim Committee studied the issue of
quantifying tribal water rights in North Dakota.219
In an effort to understand the considerations involved in developing
legislation to govern water negotiations, Agriculture and Natural Resources
Interim Committee members heard testimony from experts employed with
the North Dakota Water Commission.220 Additionally, the interim committee received information from an expert in the field who had assisted in the
adjudication of water in Idaho.221 Turtle Mountain and Fort Berthold
leaders also addressed the committee with their concerns regarding the
development of a quantification process.222
The 2005-2006 interim committee considered the issue of whether it
would be better to have a single negotiator or a group of individuals act on
behalf of the state.223 Representation from the Fort Berthold Reservation
216. Id.
217. See Hearing II on S B. 2115 Before the H. Comm. on Natural Res., 2005 Leg., 59th
Sess. 36 (N.D. Mar. 4, 2005) [hereinafter Hearing II on S.B. 2115] (statements of Tex Hall,
Chairman, Mandan, Hidatsa and Arikara Nation) (reporting that, like other tribes, the Fort
Berthold Reservation is in favor of studying the issue of quantification); see id. at 35-36
(statement of Dave Ripley, Director of Water Appropriations Division, North Dakota Water
Commission) (relaying that the state is in support of studying the issue of quantification).
218. 2005 N.D. LAWS ch. 510 § 1; J. of N.D. H.R. 42 (Mar. 21, 2005).
219. Sept. 15, 2006, Minutes of Interim Comm. on Agric. and Natural Res., 2005 Leg., 59th
Interim Sess. (N.D. 2005) [hereinafter Sept. 15, 2006, Minutes]; Jan. 12, 2006, Minutes, supra
note 131; June 6, 2006, Minutes, supra note 38; Aug. 3, 2006, Minutes of Interim Comm. on Agric.
and Natural Res., 2005 Leg., 59th Interim Sess. (N.D. 2006) [hereinafter Aug. 3, 2006, Minutes];
Sept. 21, 2006, Minutes of Interim Comm. on Agric. and Natural Res., 2005 Leg., 59th Interim
Sess. (N.D. 2006) [hereinafter Sept. 21, 2006, Minutes].
220. See Aug. 3, 2006, Minutes, supra note 219, at 2-3 (testimony of John Patch, Assistant
Division Director, Water Appropriation Division, State Water Commission) (providing information regarding creating a commission to negotiate Indian water rights similar to the State of
Montana); see also Sept. 15, 2005, Minutes, supra note 219, at 4 (testimony of Robert Shaver,
Director, Water Appropriations Division, State Water Commission) (detailing information on the
historical and judicial development of reserved water rights).
221. Jan. 12, 2006, Minutes, supra note 131, at 1-3 (testimony of Clive J. Strong, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Idaho Attorney General’s Office) (offering information regarding the
process of quantification, the preparation of quantification, and the elements that will make a
negotiation successful as consideration for developing legislation).
222. Sept. 15, 2005, Minutes, supra note 219, at 4 (statement from Gene Laducer, Tribal
Water Planner, Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa Indians); June 6, 2006, Minutes, supra note
38, at 6 (statement of Steve Kelly, Attorney, Three Affiliated Tribes).
223. See Sept. 15, 2005, Minutes, supra note 219, at 4 (statement of Tom Davis, Water
Resources Director for Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa Indians) (asking the state to look at
how Montana handles Winters rights negotiations); June 6, 2006, Minutes, supra note 38, at 6
(reviewing legislation drafted with the governor as negotiator for the state); Sept. 21, 2006,
Minutes, supra note 219, at 3 (discussing the reasoning behind choosing legislation with the
governor as the chief negotiator).

2008]

NOTE

481

noted that creating a bill using a group of representatives to negotiate on
behalf of the state would more likely pass the legislature. Members of the
committee, however, felt that the governor would be an appropriate figure
to negotiate and could call upon others in the event the governor needed
assistance.224 Some members of the legislature felt that involving a commission composed of legislators or citizens may not benefit the process
because those individuals may not possess the requisite expertise needed to
create an agreement that is beneficial to both the state and tribe.225 Turtle
Mountain agreed to create legislation appointing the governor as the
negotiator. However, Turtle Mountain leaders had asked that the legislation
be tribe specific and name Turtle Mountain as the only tribe to fall under
this negotiation legislation.226 Leaders of Turtle Mountain did not want to
force other tribal leaders into adopting a process that may not suit the needs
of their tribes.227 The committee rejected Turtle Mountain’s request on the
grounds that the bill would state that quantification was optional, and
therefore there was no need to exclude the other tribes.228 As a result of
these discussions, the North Dakota Legislative Council introduced House
Bill 1025, which designated the governor as lead negotiator for the state.229
2.

House Bill 1025

House Bill 1025 was introduced on January 3, 2007 and included two
changes from Senate Bill 2115.230 First, in response to suggestions offered
during the hearings on Senate Bill 2115, House Bill 1025 provided that
negotiated water agreements between North Dakota and a tribe would
require ratification by the legislature.231 The second and key change to the

224. See Aug. 3, 2006, Minutes, supra note 219, at 3 (statement from Steve Kelly, Attorney,
Three Affiliated Tribes) (expressing the desire that the Montana model be considered as a method
for negotiation); see also id. at 2-3 (reviewing the reasoning for a single figure negotiator).
225. Id. at 2-3. The committee had decided the new bill would be drafted with permissive
language, meaning that quantification was not mandated by the legislation. Id.
226. Sept. 21, 2006, Minutes, supra note 219, at 3 (statement of Tom Davis, Water
Resources Director for Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa Indians).
227. Id.
228. See id. (statement of Sen. Bowman) (informing that the bill “should not be limited to a
single tribe[,] but drafted as discretionary [allowing] those tribes that wish to negotiate their
reserved water rights an opportunity to do so”).
229. Id.
230. See J. of the N.D. H.R. 34 (Jan. 3, 2007) (introducing House Bill 1025).
231. See H.B. 1025 § 2(7), 2007 Leg., 60th Sess. (2007) (stating that after an agreement is
signed, it would be presented to the legislature for ratification by passing a concurrent resolution
by a majority vote of both chambers); see also Hearing on S B. 2115, supra note 37, at 17
(statement by Tex Hall, Chairman, Mandan, Hidatsa and Arikara Nation) (conveying that any
negotiated agreement “should be subject to ratification by the State legislature and signed by the
governor”).
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bill was that the governor, or his or her designee, rather than the state
engineer, would negotiate reserved water rights on behalf of the state.232
However, the state engineer was not without a role.233
The North Dakota Legislative Council deemed the state engineer as the
individual who would rule on the validity of an exception to an agreement
negotiated between a tribe and the state.234 Little response was given to the
reservations of the tribal leaders regarding the use of an administrative law
judge.235 In the event that the ruling of the state engineer was contested, the
same process as set forth in Senate Bill 2115 would be followed.236 Thus,
an administrative law judge would make a ruling and the agreement would
either be remanded for further negotiation or submitted for signatures if an
exception was overruled.237 Although an additional person was added to
the process of considering exceptions, it is unlikely that involving another
state official along with an administrative law judge afforded the protection
that North Dakota tribal leaders sought.238
Perhaps adding a two-part process to hearing exceptions was in
response to tribal requests for the involvement of more individuals in the
process of quantification.239 The two-part process of hearing exceptions
proposed by this bill consisted of a hearing by: (1) the state engineer initially, and (2) in the event that is unsatisfactory, an administrative law judge.
However, when tribal leaders sought a negotiation process with the involvement of additional people, it is unlikely that additional involvement of the
state’s executive branch was what tribal leaders had in mind.240 Tribal
232. H.B. 1025 § 1(1), 2007 Leg., 60th Legis. Assem. (N.D. 2007).
233. See id. § 2(3) (stating that the state engineer would rule on exceptions filed by current
water rights holders affected by the negotiated agreement).
234. Id.
235. See id. § 2(4) (including an administrative law judge in House Bill 1025 even after
concerns were raised regarding the use of an administrative judge with the previous bill).
236. See discussion infra note 237 and accompanying text (repeating the steps proposed in
Senate Bill 2115 that would also be followed in House Bill 1025).
237. See S.B. 2115 § 4-5, 2005 Leg., 59th Sess. (2005) (delineating the process through
which an administrative law judge will be appointed by the state engineer, that the proceedings
will fall under North Dakota Century Code section 28-32 regarding the sustaining or rejection of
an exception, and the remand of the agreement for further negotiation); see also H.B. 1025 § 2(3)(6) (instituting the same process of administrative proceedings as S.B. 2115 following any
objection to the ruling made by the state engineer to the original exception).
238. See Hearing on S B. 2115, supra note 37, at 17 (statement of Tex Hall, Chairman,
Mandan, Hidatsa and Arikara nation) (stating that the Mandan, Hidatsa and Arikara Nation would
prefer that a “Special Master” be appointed by the tribe and state to hear disputes in state court
regarding exceptions).
239. S.B. 2115 § 3; Hearing on S.B. 2115, supra note 37, at 17 (statement of Tex Hall,
Chairman, Mandan, Hidatsa and Arikara Nation) (asking for the involvement of more individuals
so that water interests of all individuals are recognized and protected).
240. See Hearing Before the U.S. Sen. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 108th Cong. 203 (Oct. 27,
2003) (statement of U.S. Sen. Kent Conrad) (relaying the tribes’ distrust of executives). The
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leaders repeatedly suggested a body or commission that would contain
representatives that were reflective of the different geographic areas and
water interests in the state.241 The suggestions of tribal leaders were ignored by the legislators drafting and amending the bill.242 Therefore, it was
of little surprise that House Bill 1025 was met with a similar response as its
predecessor.243
Although Turtle Mountain supported having the governor negotiate in
an effort to address the problems facing the tribe, support was quickly
withdrawn from the bill.244 Tom Davis, Water Resources Director for
Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa Indians, expressed his frustration
stating: “It is unfortunate that you have such little understanding of my
people, or no understanding of how we can move forward. I see that often
when I come here and it is an unfortunate thing.”245 Mr. Davis asked the
committee to consider a model of negotiation similar to that of the State of
Montana.246 He notified the committee that North Dakota tribes were in
agreement with that method because it would provide a fair way to
negotiate.247
On January 18, 2007, only fifteen days into the Sixtieth Legislative
Session, House Bill 1025 failed to pass the North Dakota House of Representatives by a vote of eleven to eighty-three.248 The message from the
legislature was clear: without tribal input and support, legislation guiding
negotiation would not pass.249 The legislature was left with a question
tribes have “a sneaking suspicion [that the quantification of reserved tribal water rights will] be
adjusted against them. Their experience is, every time they win ground, they get shorted.” Id.;
see also Jerry Reynolds, Analysis: Missouri River Reservoir Manual Comes Under Fire, INDIAN
COUNTRY TODAY, Oct. 28, 2003, at A1 (reporting on a hearing that addressed the Missouri River
Master Manual).
241. Hearing on S B. 2115, supra note 37, at 17 (statement of Tex Hall, Chairman of the
Mandan, Hidatsa and Arikara Nation).
242. See, e.g., id. (asking that legislation not include an administrative law judge and that a
board or group representative of interests negotiate on behalf of the state); Sept. 21, 2006,
Minutes, supra note 219, at 3 (asking that legislation be tribe-specific).
243. See J. of the N.D. H.R. 185 (Jan. 18, 2007) (reporting the failure to pass House Bill
1025).
244. Hearing on S B. 1025, supra note 1, at 13 (statement of Tom Davis, Water Resources
Director for Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa Indians) (“This bill, in its present form, if no
change can be made to accommodate the Turtle Mountain Tribe, as you sit down with us government to government, and have a relationship with us, and the other tribes can participate, then I
would ask not to pass this.”).
245. Id. at 14.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. See J. of the N.D. H.R. 185 (Jan. 18, 2007) (providing the roll call vote for House Bill
1025).
249. Id.; see Hearing on S B. 2115, supra note 37, at 35-40 (recording the failure of
amendments to the bill until all parties finally agreed to study the issue of quantification).
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posed just days earlier in committee: “I am hoping you will ask yourselves
whether in fact this is the way that you want to deal with your tribal
neighbors?”250
B. CONSIDERING THE MONTANA MODEL OF NEGOTIATED
SETTLEMENTS
With two failed attempts at legislation to guide quantification of tribal
water rights behind the North Dakota State Legislature, it has become
increasingly important that the state and tribes work together to develop a
process under which all parties are able to work.251 Further, the tribes have
made it clear that without tribal involvement, any proposed legislation
would be met with strong opposition.252 For the last two sessions, tribal
leaders have made suggestions that would rectify some of the concerns they
have had with the prior bills.253 Tribal leaders have asked the legislature to
form a board consisting of representatives from parties affected by the
negotiation processes, and often the State of Montana was mentioned as the
source of this idea and a guideline for the development of such a board.254
The approach taken by Montana with regard to reserve water rights
merits consideration.255 To best understand the development of Montana’s
process, the adjudication of Montana water rights and the historical perspective that led to the current quantification process is addressed.256 Additionally, the Reserved Water Rights Compact Commission, a statutorily

250. Hearing on H B. 1025, supra note 1, at 18 (statement of Steve Emery, Attorney,
Standing Rock Sioux Reservation).
251. See June 6, 2006, Minutes, supra note 38, at 6 (questioning whether the legislature
intends to create legislation that the individual tribes can agree to or whether Turtle Mountain
Reservation should file suit for the quantification of Winter rights).
252. See Hearing on S B. 2115, supra note 37, at 33-37 (consisting of proposed amendments
to the bill by tribal leaders). Senate Bill 2115 was amended into a study in order to facilitate
legislation more conducive to tribes, and it passed. See J. of the N.D. H.R. 185 (Jan. 18, 2007)
(defeating House Bill 1025).
253. See supra note 239-43 and accompanying text (discussing concerns with House Bill
1025 that tribal leaders would like addressed).
254. June 6, 2006, Minutes, supra note 38, at 6 (statement of Steve Kelly, Attorney, Mandan,
Hidatsa and Arikara Nation); Hearing on S B. 2115, supra note 37, at 16-17 (statement of Tex
Hall, Mandan, Hidatsa and Arikara Nation); Hearing on H B. 1025, supra note 1, at 12-13
(statement of Steve Emery, Attorney, Standing Rock Sioux Tribe).
255. See discussion infra Part III.C (discussing how the Montana model may be beneficial in
North Dakota); see also discussion infra Part IV (finding that the Montana model of quantification
may circumvent some of the problems the state has seen with regard to tribal opposition and failed
legislation).
256. See discussion infra Part III.B.1 (reviewing the history of tribal water adjudication and
negotiation in Montana).
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mandated board now used to negotiate tribal water rights in Montana is
analyzed.257
1.

Adjudication of Montana Water Rights: A Historical View

In 1972, water became one of the focuses of a constitutional convention held in Montana.258 Before 1972, Montana did not have a developed
process to regulate water usage, record current water usage, or regulate and
administer water rights.259 This caused great concern for the delegates of
the convention.260 Subsequently, changes were made to the constitution to
expand upon former water protections with the idea that additional provisions would protect Montana’s water from out-of-state interests.261 In order
to protect these interests, Montana enacted a comprehensive system of
water administration and record keeping.262 The Montana Water Use Act
(M.W.U.A.) asserted that all water in Montana was the state’s property and,
from that point forward, would be administered and quantified under the
M.W.U.A.263 The M.W.U.A. ignored the holding in Winters, disregarding
that a portion of that water belonged to the Indian tribes rather than the
state.264 Later that year, however, the Montana Supreme Court again recognized tribes’ water rights.265
The M.W.U.A. provided that all existing rights would be adjudicated in
Montana’s eighty-five water basins.266 Statewide adjudication of water
rights in Montana was an enormous undertaking that involved over a thousand claims per basin and continues to this day.267 In order to deal with the
extensive number of claims and issues that arose from this undertaking, the
Montana legislature created the Montana Water Court to adjudicate existing
water rights.268

257. See discussion infra Part III.B.2 (reviewing the Rural Water Compact Commission and
its creation).
258. John B. Carter, Indian Aboriginal and Reserved Water Rights, An Opportunity Lost, 64
MONT. L. REV. 377, 381 (2003).
259. Id. See generally LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF MONT. CONST. art. IX, § 3 (1972) (codified at MONT. CODE. ANN. § 85-2-701) (discussing the background of the situation in Montana
regarding water rights).
260. Carter, supra note 258, at 381.
261. Id.
262. Montana Water Usage Act, MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 85-2-101-907 (2007).
263. Id.
264. Carter, supra note 258, at 381.
265. Id.
266. WESTESEN & BRYAN, supra note 47, at 11.
267. Id.
268. MONT. CODE ANN. § 3-7-101-502 (2007).
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Montana’s first adjudication concerned the Powder River Basin.269
The Montana Department of Natural Resources and Conservation
(D.N.R.C.) reviewed all claims to water within the basin and conducted
investigations to determine the validity of the asserted claims.270 For six
years, the D.N.R.C. was in the field visiting water sites, taking photographs,
and interviewing claimants before state leaders realized that, under this
process, the quantification of eighty-four basins would take far too long.271
After this trial run at adjudication, it became evident that the system set up
under the M.W.U.A. would not adequately quantify Montana water in a
timely fashion.272
In 1979, the Montana Legislature addressed the problem pointed out by
the adjudication of the Powder River Basin with Senate Bill 76.273 This bill
changed the Montana Water Court by dividing the state into four water
divisions: the Yellowstone River, the Lower Missouri River, the Upper
Missouri River, and the Clark Fork River.274 Also, the bill provided that
each water division would have a water judge who could appoint water
masters to aid in the process of quantifying water rights.275 A “chief water
judge” and the Montana Supreme Court would oversee the “division
judges.”276
The Montana Legislature also created a board called the Reserved
Water Rights Compact Commission (R.W.R.C.C.) in anticipation of a
movement toward the negotiation of reserved tribal water rights.277 The
R.W.R.C.C. is a statutorily mandated board consisting of several members
of the state government, agency heads, and citizens that meet with tribal
governments, typically comprised of the tribal council in its entirety or in
part and other reserved water rights holders to quantify water rights.278
Since its creation in 1979, the R.W.R.C.C. has completed ten compacts,
four of which were with federally recognized Indian tribes.279

269. Carter, supra note 258, at 380-81.
270. WESTESEN & BRYAN, supra note 27, at 13.
271. Id. If it took six years to simply investigate one basin in Montana, quantifying eightyfour basins would take a considerable amount of time. Id.
272. Id.
273. S.B. 76, 1979 Leg., 45th Sess. (Mont. 1979).
274. MONT. CODE ANN. § 3-7-101-102 (1979).
275. Id. § 3-7-201.
276. Id. §§ 3-7-204, 221.
277. Id. § 2-15-212.
278. Id. § 85-2-702.
279. See id. §§ 85-20-401, 501, 701, 801 (referencing non-tribal reserved water rights
compacts formed in Montana); id. § 85-20-201 (codifying the Fort Peck Indian Reservation
agreement); id. § 85-20-301 (codifying the Northern Cheyenne Indian Reservation agreement); id.
§ 85-20-601 (codifying the Rocky Boys Indian Reservation agreement); id. § 85-20-901
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2. The Rural Water Rights Compact Commission and
Quantifying Tribal Water Rights
Montana’s R.W.R.C.C. is composed of four legislators whom are
appointed by the President of the Senate and Speaker of the House, one
republican and one democrat from each chamber.280 The governor and the
attorney general appoint the remaining five members of the board.281
Currently serving on the R.W.R.C.C is an appointed representative of the
Attorney General’s office and four “citizen members.”282 The citizen members are appointed because of their work in state agencies affected by the
quantification of federal reserved water rights such as Montana’s Water
Resources Division and State Forest Service.283 Additionally, nine fulltime employees work for the R.W.R.C.C in support and legal roles, most
with backgrounds in natural resources and conservation.284
The nine members of the board are then assigned to negotiation teams
of two or three.285 A technical team leader from the United States Fish and
Wildlife Service or the United States Forest Service leads each team.286
Because reservations are entitled to enough water to fulfill the purpose for
which the reservation was established, the R.W.R.C.C. together with its
technical staff, begins by determining the purpose for the reservation.287
After a purpose is established, negotiating parties must come to an agreement regarding the amount of water necessary to achieve that purpose.288
Both at the beginning of negotiations and after forming an agreement,
citizens of Montana are invited to contribute to the process of quantification
through public meetings.289
After a negotiation is completed, the R.W.R.C.C., the involved tribe,
and any necessary federal officials must sign the agreement.290 The
(codifying the Crow Indian Reservation agreement); id. § 85-20-1001 (codifying the Fort Belknap
Indian Reservation agreement).
280. State of Montana Home Page, http://leg.mt.gov (last visited Sept. 5, 2007).
281. Id.
282. Reserved Water Rights Compact Commission Home Page, http://dnrc.mt.gov/rwrcc/
default.asp (last visited Oct. 10, 2007).
283. Id.
284. Id. (follow the “about us” hyperlink; then follow the “staff” hyperlink).
285. Id.
286. Id.
287. See WESTESEN & BRYAN, supra note 47, at 29-30 (describing the process of negotiation in the state of Montana beginning with the determination of the purpose of the reservation);
see also Jan. 12, 2006, Minutes, supra note 131, at 1-2 (stating that negotiating parties must first
determine the purpose of the reservation).
288. WESTESEN & BRYAN, supra note 47, at 29-30.
289. Montana Department of Natural Resources, http://dnrc.mt.gov/rwrcc/about_us/
commissioners.asp (last visited Oct. 10, 2007).
290. MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-702(3) (2007).
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agreement then must be ratified in the Montana Legislature and presented to
Montana’s Water Court so that it may be incorporated into a final decree
regarding all quantification of that specific body of water.291 Montana law
provides that if approval of the legislature and a tribe does not occur before
July 1, 2009, any claims that are not solidified under the compact will be
filed with the R.W.R.C.C. and used in the formulation of preliminary
decree.292
C. WILL THE MONTANA MODEL WORK IN NORTH DAKOTA?
The Montana model for negotiation has surfaced repeatedly during
discussions of Indian water negotiations in North Dakota, but to the dismay
of tribal leaders, the North Dakota State Legislature has instead continued
to pursue bills modeled after Oregon’s method.293 However, with tension
rising between tribal leaders and the state over this issue and the situation at
the Turtle Mountain Reservation becoming more serious, it is time for
North Dakota leaders to listen to their tribal neighbors and consider the
Montana method to quantify federal reserved water rights.
Upon first glance, there are aspects of the M.W.U.A. that cannot be
transplanted to North Dakota because of differences in the political climate
and a lack of resources.294 For example, Montana law mandated a statewide adjudication, meaning that all water rights on all basins in the state
had to be quantified.295 A mandated statewide adjudication does not appear
to be the path that tribal or state leaders want to take with regard to the
quantification of water in North Dakota.296 Several of the tribes do not

291. Id.
292. Id.
293. See OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 539.310, 539.320, 539.330, 539.340, 539.350 (2007)
(stating that federally recognized tribes may negotiate water settlements with the “Water
Resources Director”). This legislation follows the same process as Senate Bill 2115. See supra
Part III.A.1 (explaining the process that Senate Bill 2115 proposes, whereby one person negotiates
federal reserved water rights on behalf of a state).
294. Compare MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-701 (2007) (codifying that adjudication will occur
statewide), with Hearing on H.B. 1025, supra note 1, at 17 (statement of Steve Emery, Attorney,
Standing Rock Sioux Reservation) (stating that the tribe is not ready to negotiate reserved water
rights and that tribes should be reluctant to accept House Bill 1025 despite the permissive nature
of the bill because it will bind them to a similar style of quantification).
295. MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-15-212 (2007). Montana was continuing the process of creating
a statewide system of water regulation and administration, requiring all rights in the state to be
claimed and adjudicated. See discussion supra Part III.B.1 (explaining the process begun by the
1973 Constitutional Convention).
296. See Hearing on H B. 1025, supra note 1, 17 (statement of Steve Emery, Attorney,
Standing Rock Sioux Reservation) (informing the committee that the Standing Rock Sioux tribe
does not desire to quantify water rights at this time); see also Hearing on S.B. 2115, supra note
37, at 16 (statement of Tex Hall, Chairman, Mandan, Hidatsa and Arikara Nation) (stating that he
“appreciates the permissive nature of the bill” and that it does not mandate quantification).

2008]

NOTE

489

desire and are not prepared to adjudicate water rights.297 Similar to Senate
Bill 2115 and House Bill 1025, a lack of tribal support will likely result in
arriving at another dead end.298 Further, mandated statewide adjudication is
also currently not a reality for the state of North Dakota.299 In order to
mirror Montana’s system, the North Dakota Legislature would need to
create a water court to hear the disputes regarding quantification and set
down final decrees of water rights.300 Creating a water court would require
additional money and personnel resources to create a board similar to the
R.W.R.C.C.301 The R.W.R.C.C. is served by a staff of nine full time employees.302 While representatives of the North Dakota Water Commission
believe that adequate resources to handle negotiations between Turtle
Mountain and the state exist, those representatives also note that if any
other tribe elects to quantify, additional staff would be needed.303
Although it is unlikely that North Dakota will take on the daunting task
of a statewide adjudication, the concept of using a board or commission to
negotiate is not fatally flawed.304 While a full time board like the

297. See Hearing on H B. 1025, supra note 1, at 17 (statement of Steve Emery,
representative of the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe) (“We have not consented to meet with anyone to
quantify [Indian water rights] and we are not looking to quantify them at the moment. If and
when our Government changes that position, we will be the first to let you know.”); see also id. at
38 (statement of Tex Hall, Chairman, Mandan, Hidatsa and Arikara Nation) (stating that although
the Mandan, Hidatsa and Arikara Nation of Fort Berthold understands quantification will achieve
“maximum certainty for water users,” the tribe is not ready to “[bless] any process concerning the
quantification of their water rights”).
298. See id. at 17 (statement of Steve Emery, representative, Standing Rock Sioux Tribe)
(stating that the bill should remain permissive and language mandating quantification should not
be added unless the legislature is looking for tribal opposition to the bill); Hearing on S B. 2115,
supra note 37, at 16 (statement of Tex Hall, Chairman, Mandan, Hidatsa and Arikara Nation)
(asking that the legislature maintain the permissive nature of the bill and refrain from mandating
quantification for all North Dakota tribes).
299. See Aug. 3, 2006, Minutes, supra note 219, at 3 (statement of Dave Ripley, Director of
Water Appropriations Division, North Dakota Water Commission) (reporting that the North
Dakota Water Commission has enough resources to handle negotiations with Turtle Mountain).
300. Id. However, if more than just the Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa Indians wanted
to negotiate, the North Dakota Water Commission is unlikely to have adequate resources. Id.
301. Id.
302. Id.
303. Id.
304. See id. at 3 (statement of Dave Ripley, Director of Water Appropriations Division,
North Dakota Water Commission) (stating that the North Dakota Water Commission does not
have enough resources to quantify rights with tribes other than Turtle Mountain at this time); see
also June 6, 2006, Minutes, supra note 38, at 6 (statement of Steve Kelly, Attorney, Three
Affiliated Tribes) (requesting that the legislature consider the Montana model of quantification);
Sept. 15, 2005, Minutes, supra note 219, at 5 (statement from Gene Laducer, Tribal Water
Planner, Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa Indians) (expressing the desire for North Dakota to
pursue Montana’s model of negotiating tribal water rights). While North Dakota may not be
prepared to handle a quantification of all statewide resources, a board could still benefit in the
situation with Turtle Mountain and could operate on a more part time basis. Hearing on H B.
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R.W.R.C.C with permanent staff may not be required, a similar commission
could be used that operates with volunteers or appointees and a smaller
staff.305 One of the major advantages of a board handling negotiation is that
it brings an element of fairness to the process whereby parties with a stake
in the negotiation are represented.306 A board that includes elected officials
brings political accountability into the process.307 Further, having elected
representatives serve on the board will also create a situation where those
representatives can act as liaisons to the legislature, whereby they can inform and educate other representatives as to the negotiation process thereby
making it more likely that an agreement will withstand legislative
ratification.308
Using Montana as a guide, a North Dakota commission would also
have representatives from the North Dakota Water Commission (Water
Commission).309 Involvement of the Water Commission would provide
local expertise regarding water systems, regulation, and needs.310 Further,
the Water Commission has record of all rights holders currently using water
in each basin.311 North Dakota tribes including Turtle Mountain have been
using water under the permit system. Records of that usage may provide a
starting point for negotiations.312

1025, supra note 1, at 3-5 (statement of Dave Ripley, Director of Water Appropriations Division,
North Dakota Water Commission).
305. See Aug. 3, 2006, Minutes, supra note 219, at 3 (statement of Dave Ripley, Director of
Water Appropriations Division, North Dakota Water Commission) (stating that the Water
Commission has the resources available to assist or facilitate a quantification negotiation with
Turtle Mountain).
306. See Hearing on S B. 2115, supra note 37, at 17 (statement of Tex Hall, Chairman,
Mandan, Hidatsa and Arikara Nation) (noting that having a participatory board would make the
process more “fair”).
307. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-15-212 (2007) (including two members from each chamber
of the Montana Legislature). The voters of Montana elect the members in both the Montana State
Senate and House of Representatives. MONT. CONST. art. V, § 3 (2007) (stating that Montana
House of Representative Members are elected for two years and Montana Senators are elected for
four years).
308. See Jan. 12, 2006, Minutes, supra note 131, at 2 (statement of Clive J. Strong, Idaho
Chief Assistant Attorney General) (having legislators to facilitate the process is one reason
Montana chose a commission rather than Oregon’s approach of an individual negotiating).
309. See id. (creating the R.W.R.C.C. with members from the Montana Department of
Natural Resources, the equivalent to North Dakota’s Water Commission).
310. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-01-01 (2008) (charging the North Dakota Water
Commission with the responsibility of collecting data, maintaining records, and supervising the
usage of water in the state).
311. Id. The North Dakota Water Commission maintains records of permits in the state. Id.
§ 61-02-03.
312. See Aug. 3, 2006, Minutes, supra note 219, at 3 (statement of Gene Laducer, Tribal
Water Planner, Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa Indians) (stating that Turtle Mountain
currently diverts water under permits obtained from the state water commission).
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In addition to creating a body where interested parties could work
together, the Montana model provides that after quantification, the tribe will
administer water rights.313 Although states have never had the jurisdiction
to administer tribal water rights, leaving tribal water rights unquantified, in
effect, gives states that ability.314 Many tribes seek quantification for the
very purpose of managing the tribe’s resources independent from state
control.315 In Montana, all control of water after quantification rests with
the tribe.316 Tribes are then charged with developing water codes to
regulate and administer water within the reservation borders.317 Although
these codes are subject to the final approval of the U.S. Department of the
Interior as trustee, this department has not issued approval for water codes
of quantified water rights in nearly two decades.318 Many tribes and states
incorporate language providing for the tribal management of water into the
agreement and implement the agreement and subsequent water code
without the approval of the Department of the Interior.319
The Montana model of quantification allows for the input of
representatives who understand the stakes of an unfair or unjust water
agreement.320 Further, three of four federally recognized tribes in North
Dakota have expressed support for pursuing legislation modeled after
Montana.321 Tribal support along with the unarguable premise that

313. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 85-20-201, 301, 601, 901, 1001 (2007).
314. See BOBROFF ET AL., supra note 14, at 1202 (stating that the federal government has not
given states the jurisdiction to regulate tribal water). However, as seen by states like North
Dakota and Montana, until water is quantified, state administrative departments do regulate those
resources. See Sept. 15, 2005, Minutes, supra note 219, at 3-4 (clarifying that Turtle Mountain
Reservation is currently using water under the state permitting system); Carter, supra note 258, at
381 (stating that until Montana water is negotiated with tribes, it is under state administration).
315. BOBROFF ET AL., supra note 14, at 1212.
316. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-702(3) (2007) (detailing that after ratification, water
management will be the right of the tribes).
317. BOBROFF ET AL., supra note 14, at 1204.
318. Id. at 1205.
319. Id. In the mid-1980s, the Secretary of the Interior ordered that any water codes
submitted to the Department of the Interior be returned to tribes without approval. Id. at 1205
n.274.
320. See supra note 308 and accompanying text (noting that reasons exist for considering
Montana’s quantification methods).
321. See generally Hearing on S B. 2115, supra note 37, at 1-17 (providing statements from
leaders expressing support for the Montana model of quantification); Hearing on S B. 1025, supra
note 1, at 4-20 (repeating the statements from these meetings where a representative from each
tribe expressed interest in the Montana method). The Spirit Lake Nation did not offer formal
testimony regarding the position of their tribe during these hearings. See id. (noting no testimony
from Spirit Lake leaders); Hearing on S B. 2115, supra note 37, at 1-17 (recording no Spirit Lake
testimony).
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additional representation may create a more fair process certainly warrants
consideration of similar legislation.322
IV. CONCLUSION—THE FUTURE OF TRIBAL WATER IN NORTH
DAKOTA
Quantification of tribal water rights has become a complex field of
varying law and varying results.323 Many states have waited for tribal water
rights to further develop before beginning quantification.324 Without
quantification, however, tribes watch as more and more water is
appropriated to non-Indian water users and the possibility of losing rights in
the face of equitable distribution of water has prompted many tribes to
choose negotiation.325 Meeting government-to-government to resolve
Indian water rights seems like the only logical option for North Dakota
tribes.326 Negotiation allows tribal leaders the opportunity to walk away
from the negotiating table if fair treatment of Indian water rights is not
afforded.327
The goal of tribal leaders is simple.328 Steve Emery, an attorney for the
Standing Rock Sioux Reservation stated: “We want to make sure that
because our homeland isn’t going to move, we have enough water
forever.”329 Achieving this goal is not as simple.330 After nearly a decade
of looking at quantification and hearing the request of North Dakota tribes,
it seems clear that the future of tribal water rights is pursuing a model of
negotiation that allows a board to participate similar to that of Montana.331

322. See Hearing on S.B. 2115, supra note 37, at 17 (testimony of Tex Hall, Chairman,
Mandan, Hidatsa and Arikara Nation) (stating that the process would be more fair with additional
involvement).
323. BOBROFF ET AL., supra note 14, at 1212-13.
324. Williams, supra note 12, at 37. These states are hoping that through additional development, reliability and continuity will be added to the process. Id.
325. Id.
326. See Hearing on S B. 2115, supra note 37, at 10-18 (expressing hope that agreements can
be made government-to-government).
327. See Hearing on H.B. 1025, supra note 1, at 2 (statement of Dave Ripley, Director of
Water Appropriations Division, North Dakota Water Commission) (stating that negotiated agreements would be willing parties to reach an agreement).
328. See supra note 297 and accompanying text (mentioning the goals of North Dakota
leaders).
329. Hearing on H B. 1025, supra note 1, at 18-19 (statement of Steve Emery, Attorney,
Standing Rock Sioux Tribe).
330. Id.
331. See id. (citing multiple requests from tribal leaders to pursue Montana-modeled
legislation and a statement from the Water Commission that it is worth consideration).
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